Biology & Philosophy最新文献

One of the guiding ideas in modern environmentalist thought is that we shouldn’t interfere with nature. It’s better to leave it alone. Many of the arguments offered in favor of this presumption against environmental interference are epistemic. One such argument focuses on ineffectiveness. It says that conservation interventions often do not accomplish their goals. A second argument says that well-intentioned interference in nature produces many harmful unintended consequences. I show that these arguments do not justify the presumption against environmental interference. Both arguments depend on stronger claims, such as the claim that conservation interventions do more harm than good overall. Yet, evidence-based conservation studies do not support the idea that conservation interventions generally do not work, or that they do more harm than good. These facts seriously undermine the presumption against environmental interference.

During the past few decades, fitness-centered and trait-centered definitions of natural selection have coexisted in the philosophical literature. The former render natural selection definitionally dependent on the presence of fitness differences, where “fitness” is understood as a distinct property from actual reproductive success. On the other hand, trait-centered definitions see selection as definitionally dependent on the presence of a causal relation between a trait (not necessarily fitness) and reproductive success. Interestingly, endorsers of these definitions have rarely–and usually only cursorily–critically engaged the views of the other camp. Therefore, a critical comparison of the two kinds of definitions is lacking in the literature. This paper starts filling this void by opening a discussion about which of the two kinds of definition is more appropriate. I first argue that fitness-centered definitions have difficulties in accommodating cases of opposing selection on correlated traits, whereas trait-centered views have no such problems. To do so, I revisit an old argument put forth by Elliott Sober and I show that recent attempts from the fitness-centered camp to reply to Sober’s charge are unsuccessful. I then show that fitness-centered views also have problems with a different type of case, namely opposing selection on a single trait; trait-centered views, on the other hand, may accommodate such cases if, as I propose here, we specify that the causal relation that figures prominently in them is understood as a relation of contributing causation. These arguments suggest that trait-centered definitions of selection are preferable to fitness-centered ones.

Model organisms are at the centre of progress in biology but attributing them an excessive representational power and concentrating on a limited group of them, although efficient for research, can have negative consequences, mainly of epistemic nature. Here, I argue that model organisms are exploratory models with a perspectival modelling function, and that a deflated representational power is needed for their proper use. In support of this argument, I will analyse developmental biology as a case study. Firstly, I show that model organisms in developmental biology are not selected because of their representational capabilities, but mainly based on practical criteria. Secondly, I defend that the epistemic organization of developmental biology around questions fosters exploration and perspectival modelling and I propose that developmental biology is a ‘model organism situated knowledge’. Lastly, I use the study of the mechanisms of cell fate acquisition during early embryonic development in C. elegans and mice as a case study to illustrate how a plurality of model organisms allows exploration and perspectival modelling. The use of model organisms for exploration and perspectival modelling, with a limited representational power, should allow more adequate inferences about human embryonic development and encourage the introduction of more model organisms for a comprehensive navigation of the space of possibilities.

This paper proposes an original definition of samples as a kind of data within the relational framework of data. The distinction between scientific objects (e.g., samples, data, models) often needs to be clarified in the philosophy of science to understand their role in the scientific inquiry. The relational framework places data at the forefront of knowledge construction. Their epistemic status depends on their evaluation as potential evidence in a research situation and their ability to circulate among researchers. While samples are significant in data-generating science, their role has been underexplored in the philosophy of data literature. I draw on a case study from data-centric microbiology, viz. amplicon sequencing, to introduce specifications of the relational framework. These specifications capture the distinctive epistemic role of samples, allowing the discussion of their significance in the inquiry process. I argue that samples are necessarily transformed to be considered as evidence, portable in the limits of a situation, and they act as world anchors for claims about a phenomenon. I compare these specifications with other data and evidence frameworks and suggest they are compatible. The paper concludes by considering the extension of these criteria in the context of biobanking. The specifications proposed here help analyze other life sciences cases and deepen our understanding of samples and their epistemological role in scientific research.

This paper delves into the character concept as applied to reproduction. Our argument is that the prevailing functional-adaptationist perspective falls short in explaining the evolution of reproductive traits, and we propose an alternative organismal-relational approach that incorporates the developmental and interactive aspects of reproduction. To begin, we define the functional individuation of reproductive traits as evolutionary strategies aimed at enhancing fitness, and we demonstrate how this perspective influences the classification of reproductive characters and modes, the comprehension of shared traits as resulting from conflicts of evolutionary interest between individuals, and the explanation of reproductive diversity. After outlining the shortcomings of this framework, we introduce an organismal-relational approach grounded in evolutionary developmental studies of reproduction. This view provides a revised classification for reproductive characters and modes and offers a new understanding of interorganismal traits that takes into account their inherently relational nature. Lastly, we present the research agenda that emerges from this approach, which addresses the core explanatory gaps left by the adaptationist perspective, including the explanation of reproductive homologies and homoplasies, the developmental constraints associated with the evolution of reproductive modes, and the evolvability of reproductive characters.

Proponents of the extended evolutionary synthesis have argued that there are explanatory gaps in evolutionary biology that cannot be bridged by standard evolutionary theory. In this paper, we consider what sort of explanatory gaps they are referring to. We outline three possibilities: data-based gaps, implementation-based gaps, and framework-based gaps. We then examine the purported evolutionary gaps and attempt to classify them using this taxonomy. From there we reconsider the significance of the gaps and what they imply for the proposed need for an extended evolutionary synthesis.

Norms play a crucial role in governing human societies. From an early age, humans possess an innate understanding of norms, recognizing certain behaviours, contexts, and roles as being governed by them. The evolution of normativity has been linked to its contribution to the promotion of cooperation in large groups and is intertwined with the development of joint intentionality. However, there is no evolutionary consensus on what normatively differentiated our hominin ancestors from the phylogenetic lineage leading to chimpanzees and bonobos. Here we propose that the development of teaching through a process of evaluative feedback between parent and offspring functioned as a prerequisite for the later development of normativity. Parents approve or disapprove of offspring’s behaviours based on their own learned knowledge of what is appropriate or inappropriate. We argue our proposition using a simple model of cultural transmission, which shows the adaptive advantage offered by these elementary forms of teaching. We show that an important part of this adaptive advantage can arise from the benefits derived from guidance about which behaviours to adopt or reject. We propose that this type of guidance has fundamental elements that characterise the normative world. We complete our argument by reviewing several studies that examine the emergence of normativity in young children without prior exposure to a normative framework with respect to the behaviours under analysis. We suggest that this normativity is best interpreted as manifestations of teaching among young children rather than as norm recognition among early normative children.

Evolutionary changes and interspecific diversity in sexual coercion and autonomy are often linked to indirect selection on mate preferences. Yet, this approach overlooks the small fraction of indirect selection in total selection on mate choice and assumes unnecessarily specific conditions in the recent ‘autonomy-enhancing’ risk-reduction model. This paper proposes a more parsimonious approach based on direct selection and basic signalling theory, incorporating ecological variables to better explain sexual biodiversity. Particularly, the spatial dimensionality of mating environments is emphasized for its role in enhancing sexual freedom through both diminishing monopolization and elevating escape potential from sexual coercion. Empirical evidence, ranging from waterfowl to humans, seems to better align with this ecologically constrained signalling perspective. Furthermore, it suggests that choosers keep coercion risk at ecological baseline by leveraging their escape potential. This repositions intriguing protective elements like bowerbirds' constructions as courtship features that have been bargained to respect sexual autonomy rather than enhancing it through indirect selection. It implies that courtship induced risks, such as reduced mobility, may in principle increase substantially precisely because they are offset by protective measures. Future research could reveal the prevalence of such risk-balancing strategies, advancing our understanding of mating dynamics. This work suggests new theoretical and empirical research avenues within the ecology of mating dynamics.

Frans de Waal (1948-2024) transformed our understanding of primate cognition and social behavior, shaping the perspectives of scientists, philosophers, and the general public through his groundbreaking research and engagingpopular books.

This paper examines existing frameworks for understanding domestication and proposes a domestication landscape framework. Driven by the selection pressures of captivity and/or mutualism within a domesticator-dominated environment, domestication is the generations-long multidirectional process through which a domesticate accumulates new genetic and behavioral traits, potentially causing reproductive isolation between wild and domestic forms of the domesticate organism. Rather than understanding domestication as fixed states in a wild/domestic binary, domestication can be best understood as a dynamic multidimensional process of growing and declining domesticator influence on a domesticate’s genes and behavior. The categories, of wild, feral, tame, and domestic exist as blurry regions within a two-dimensional landscape that species will traverse at variable speeds. An organism’s path will vary depending on its environment and the particular domestication relationship at play. Domestication occurs through two potential pathways, either through captivity or through mutualism, though both may no longer be required once a domesticate’s dependence on the domesticator becomes clearly established. For the purposes of domestication, captivity requires intentional containment and resource dependence or reproductive control. When driven by mutualism, the domestication process does not require intent and, thereby, can occur with non-human domesticators. Alongside the coordinative consensus principle, the domestication landscape model can help achieve more functional pluralism between disciplines within domestication studies when organisms’ levels of genetic and behavioral influence are provided. Finally, this model suggests that while dingoes may have at one point been domesticated, it may be appropriate to view them as wild and perhaps even native organisms.