Biology & Philosophy最新文献

Proteins are often defined as the molecules that enable life thanks to the special functions they display. But what are proteins' functions? Despite their relevance in various debates, the answer to this question is often left implicit. This paper argues that a correct characterisation of proteins' functions must consider the native structure of the protein, building on Bellazzi's definition of biochemical functions: proteins' functions are dispositions associated to specific chemical and geometrical structural properties relevant for the tertiary and quaternary structure of proteins, and they contribute to specific evolved biological processes. Section 1 introduces the problem of protein's functions. Section 2 unpacks the "structure problem" and the "function problem", where the former inquiries into the function bearer of proteins' function and the second into the relevant account of function. Section 3 presents an answer to the structure problem by arguing that the focus should be on native structure. Section 4 and Sect. 5 focus on the function problem and the account defended. Section 5 also considers two specific case studies, haemoglobin and crystallins, and a critical evaluation of the account. Section 6 concludes.

One of the distinctive features of some norms is thought to be their externalised character. To say that a norm is externalised is to say that it is experienced as imposed on us from the outside and exacting a demand on all, regardless of their group (Stanford in Behav Brain Sci 14:1-13, 2018a). Stanford (Behav Brain Sci 14:1-13, 2018a) argues that externalisation evolved to facilitate correlated interaction among cooperators. However, he failed to specify the means by which externalisation achieves correlated interaction. In this article, I argue that externalisation secures correlated interaction via commitment. I also offer an account of the emergence of externalised norms that further draws attention to the role of commitments in securing correlated interaction over our evolutionary history.

Is syntax an evolutionary novelty in the human lineage? This question, along with the question of how human syntax evolved, is highly debated in the field of language evolution. In this paper, I reconstruct two prominent frameworks for studying the evolution of human syntax, which I call "unbounded hierarchy" (Bolhuis et al. 2018 in PLoS Biol 16(6):e2005157, 2018. 10.1371/journal.pbio.2005157) and "compositional semantics" (Townsend et al. 2018 in PLoS Biol 16(8):e2006425, 2018. 10.1371/journal.pbio.2006425). I argue that both frameworks face problems when it comes to explaining the evolution of human syntax. Considering these problems, as well as empirical evidence of hierarchy in nonhuman animals, I provide an alternative framework for studying the evolution of human syntax, which I call "bounded hierarchy". The bounded hierarchy framework that I propose traces the evolutionary origins of human syntax to simpler forms of bounded hierarchy that may be present in extant nonhuman animals.

This paper reconceptualizes social constructionism about race (hereafter SCR). While SCR is considered a hegemonic view in philosophy and academia more broadly, Hochman (2022) argues that this hegemony is illusory. He identifies different versions of SCR in the literature, showing that race constructionists do not share a single, common view. For him, race constructionists are not even united in rejecting biological race realism, and the label "social constructionism about race" is so inclusive that it has become almost useless. I identify what is missing in Hochman's analysis, namely, the recognition that SCR is an investigative practice (Brigandt 2012; Brigandt and Love 2012; Neto 2020). This recognition demands shifting focus from what race constructionists claim to what they do. By operating this shift, I explain why SCR remains an alternative to biological race realism in a important and specific sense, and why the label "social constructionism about race" is still useful.

One of the guiding ideas in modern environmentalist thought is that we shouldn’t interfere with nature. It’s better to leave it alone. Many of the arguments offered in favor of this presumption against environmental interference are epistemic. One such argument focuses on ineffectiveness. It says that conservation interventions often do not accomplish their goals. A second argument says that well-intentioned interference in nature produces many harmful unintended consequences. I show that these arguments do not justify the presumption against environmental interference. Both arguments depend on stronger claims, such as the claim that conservation interventions do more harm than good overall. Yet, evidence-based conservation studies do not support the idea that conservation interventions generally do not work, or that they do more harm than good. These facts seriously undermine the presumption against environmental interference.

During the past few decades, fitness-centered and trait-centered definitions of natural selection have coexisted in the philosophical literature. The former render natural selection definitionally dependent on the presence of fitness differences, where “fitness” is understood as a distinct property from actual reproductive success. On the other hand, trait-centered definitions see selection as definitionally dependent on the presence of a causal relation between a trait (not necessarily fitness) and reproductive success. Interestingly, endorsers of these definitions have rarely–and usually only cursorily–critically engaged the views of the other camp. Therefore, a critical comparison of the two kinds of definitions is lacking in the literature. This paper starts filling this void by opening a discussion about which of the two kinds of definition is more appropriate. I first argue that fitness-centered definitions have difficulties in accommodating cases of opposing selection on correlated traits, whereas trait-centered views have no such problems. To do so, I revisit an old argument put forth by Elliott Sober and I show that recent attempts from the fitness-centered camp to reply to Sober’s charge are unsuccessful. I then show that fitness-centered views also have problems with a different type of case, namely opposing selection on a single trait; trait-centered views, on the other hand, may accommodate such cases if, as I propose here, we specify that the causal relation that figures prominently in them is understood as a relation of contributing causation. These arguments suggest that trait-centered definitions of selection are preferable to fitness-centered ones.

Model organisms are at the centre of progress in biology but attributing them an excessive representational power and concentrating on a limited group of them, although efficient for research, can have negative consequences, mainly of epistemic nature. Here, I argue that model organisms are exploratory models with a perspectival modelling function, and that a deflated representational power is needed for their proper use. In support of this argument, I will analyse developmental biology as a case study. Firstly, I show that model organisms in developmental biology are not selected because of their representational capabilities, but mainly based on practical criteria. Secondly, I defend that the epistemic organization of developmental biology around questions fosters exploration and perspectival modelling and I propose that developmental biology is a ‘model organism situated knowledge’. Lastly, I use the study of the mechanisms of cell fate acquisition during early embryonic development in C. elegans and mice as a case study to illustrate how a plurality of model organisms allows exploration and perspectival modelling. The use of model organisms for exploration and perspectival modelling, with a limited representational power, should allow more adequate inferences about human embryonic development and encourage the introduction of more model organisms for a comprehensive navigation of the space of possibilities.

This paper proposes an original definition of samples as a kind of data within the relational framework of data. The distinction between scientific objects (e.g., samples, data, models) often needs to be clarified in the philosophy of science to understand their role in the scientific inquiry. The relational framework places data at the forefront of knowledge construction. Their epistemic status depends on their evaluation as potential evidence in a research situation and their ability to circulate among researchers. While samples are significant in data-generating science, their role has been underexplored in the philosophy of data literature. I draw on a case study from data-centric microbiology, viz. amplicon sequencing, to introduce specifications of the relational framework. These specifications capture the distinctive epistemic role of samples, allowing the discussion of their significance in the inquiry process. I argue that samples are necessarily transformed to be considered as evidence, portable in the limits of a situation, and they act as world anchors for claims about a phenomenon. I compare these specifications with other data and evidence frameworks and suggest they are compatible. The paper concludes by considering the extension of these criteria in the context of biobanking. The specifications proposed here help analyze other life sciences cases and deepen our understanding of samples and their epistemological role in scientific research.

This paper delves into the character concept as applied to reproduction. Our argument is that the prevailing functional-adaptationist perspective falls short in explaining the evolution of reproductive traits, and we propose an alternative organismal-relational approach that incorporates the developmental and interactive aspects of reproduction. To begin, we define the functional individuation of reproductive traits as evolutionary strategies aimed at enhancing fitness, and we demonstrate how this perspective influences the classification of reproductive characters and modes, the comprehension of shared traits as resulting from conflicts of evolutionary interest between individuals, and the explanation of reproductive diversity. After outlining the shortcomings of this framework, we introduce an organismal-relational approach grounded in evolutionary developmental studies of reproduction. This view provides a revised classification for reproductive characters and modes and offers a new understanding of interorganismal traits that takes into account their inherently relational nature. Lastly, we present the research agenda that emerges from this approach, which addresses the core explanatory gaps left by the adaptationist perspective, including the explanation of reproductive homologies and homoplasies, the developmental constraints associated with the evolution of reproductive modes, and the evolvability of reproductive characters.

Proponents of the extended evolutionary synthesis have argued that there are explanatory gaps in evolutionary biology that cannot be bridged by standard evolutionary theory. In this paper, we consider what sort of explanatory gaps they are referring to. We outline three possibilities: data-based gaps, implementation-based gaps, and framework-based gaps. We then examine the purported evolutionary gaps and attempt to classify them using this taxonomy. From there we reconsider the significance of the gaps and what they imply for the proposed need for an extended evolutionary synthesis.