Mandatory audit partner rotation and earnings informativeness in the bond market

IF 2.6 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE FINANCIAL REVIEW Pub Date : 2024-09-18 DOI:10.1111/fire.12415
He Xiao, Yaohua Qin
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Abstract

This study finds that mandatory rotation of engagement partners results in more positive earnings response coefficient (ERC) in the years immediately following rotation than in the years that are not. Further analysis reveals that the positive association is driven by firms that announce bad earnings news and for bonds with longer maturity terms. Furthermore, such positive association is stronger when the incoming engagement partner has more industry expertise than the leaving partner, when the audit firm is a non–Big 6 auditor, and when the client firm is small. Finally, the relationship does not exist for voluntary partner rotation.
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强制审计合伙人轮换制与债券市场的盈利信息性
本研究发现,强制轮换聘用合伙人会在轮换后的年份比未轮换年份产生更多的正收益反应系数(ERC)。进一步的分析表明,公布坏收益消息的公司和到期期限较长的债券会产生正相关。此外,当新任参与合伙人比离任合伙人拥有更多行业专业知识时,当审计公司为非六大审计公司时,以及当客户公司规模较小时,这种正相关性更强。最后,在合伙人自愿轮换的情况下,这种关系并不存在。
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来源期刊
FINANCIAL REVIEW
FINANCIAL REVIEW BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
3.30
自引率
28.10%
发文量
39
期刊最新文献
Issue Information From anecdotes to insights: Streamlining the research idea generation process Mandatory audit partner rotation and earnings informativeness in the bond market Carbon risk and equity prices The value of talents
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