TAVA: Traceable anonymity-self-controllable V2X Authentication over dynamic multiple charging-service providers

Abstract

The widespread deployment of Electric vehicles (EVs) leads to an increasing demand for charging piles and corresponding charging service (CS) from CS providers (CSPs). Pseudonym-based authentication mechanisms have been designed to resist the attacks which exploit the charging-authentication information to infer EV users’ identities and their driving routes. However, these existing mechanisms generated EV users' pseudonyms by relying on a trusted third entity, which affects the authentication system's resilience and EV user privacy-preservation.

To this end, this paper proposes a Traceable Anonymity-self-controllable V2X Authentication (TAVA) scheme for the multiple-CSP (forming a CSP set) scenario, where each CSP independently manages its own CPs and a CSP randomly joins or leaves the CSP set. TAVA has a series of security capabilities. (1) First, it allows the mutual authentication between an EV user and a CP, while preserving EV user privacy and also assuring forward and backward security. This capability is achieved by using the multi-party computation technique to let all CSPs join the process of generating EV-users’ credentials but each CSP knows nothing about the credentials. (2) Secondly, TAVA has the capabilities of self-controllable anonymity and unlinkability by allowing each EV user to self-generate verifiable and unlinkable one-time pseudonyms based on bilinear- mapping technique. (3) At last, each EV user under TAVA is traceable. It is achieved by applying the two-factor authentication technique in TAVA and linking the one-time pseudonym to the two factors, namely, the credential and the EV user's biometric characteristics with low entropy rates. Note that all these security capabilities are achieved with less performance degradation in terms of communication and storage overheads in the dynamic environment. We conduct the informal and formal analysis of security capabilities and also make performance evaluations. The results indicate that, compared with the latest works, the computation overhead of the mutual authentication in TAVA is reduced by up to 89 %.