Stronger Patent Regime, Innovation and Scientist Mobility

IF 1.2 Q3 ECONOMICS Research in Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-18 DOI:10.1016/j.rie.2024.101004

Madhuparna Ganguly

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of a stronger patent regime on innovation incentives, patenting propensity and scientist mobility when an innovating firm can partially recover its damage due to scientist movement from the infringing rival. The strength of the patent system, which is a function of litigation success probability and damage recovery proportion, stipulates expected indemnification. We show that stronger patents fail to reduce the likelihood of infringement and further, decrease the innovation’s expected profitability. Higher potential reparation also reduces the scientist’s expected return on R&D knowledge, entailing greater R&D investment. Our results suggest important considerations for patent reforms.

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加强专利制度、创新和科学家流动性

本文分析了当创新企业可以部分弥补因竞争对手侵权而造成的科学家流动损失时，较强的专利制度对创新激励、专利申请倾向和科学家流动的影响。专利制度的强度是诉讼成功概率和损害赔偿比例的函数，它规定了预期赔偿。我们的研究表明，较强的专利并不能降低侵权的可能性，反而会降低创新的预期收益率。更高的潜在赔偿也会降低科学家对研发知识的预期回报，从而导致研发投资的增加。我们的研究结果为专利改革提供了重要依据。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Research in Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

89 days

期刊介绍： Established in 1947, Research in Economics is one of the oldest general-interest economics journals in the world and the main one among those based in Italy. The purpose of the journal is to select original theoretical and empirical articles that will have high impact on the debate in the social sciences; since 1947, it has published important research contributions on a wide range of topics. A summary of our editorial policy is this: the editors make a preliminary assessment of whether the results of a paper, if correct, are worth publishing. If so one of the associate editors reviews the paper: from the reviewer we expect to learn if the paper is understandable and coherent and - within reasonable bounds - the results are correct. We believe that long lags in publication and multiple demands for revision simply slow scientific progress. Our goal is to provide you a definitive answer within one month of submission. We give the editors one week to judge the overall contribution and if acceptable send your paper to an associate editor. We expect the associate editor to provide a more detailed evaluation within three weeks so that the editors can make a final decision before the month expires. In the (rare) case of a revision we allow four months and in the case of conditional acceptance we allow two months to submit the final version. In both cases we expect a cover letter explaining how you met the requirements. For conditional acceptance the editors will verify that the requirements were met. In the case of revision the original associate editor will do so. If the revision cannot be at least conditionally accepted it is rejected: there is no second revision.