(Mal)adaptive Mentalizing in the Cognitive Hierarchy, and Its Link to Paranoia.

Computational psychiatry (Cambridge, Mass.) Pub Date : 2024-09-11 eCollection Date: 2024-01-01 DOI:10.5334/cpsy.117
Nitay Alon, Lion Schulz, Vaughan Bell, Michael Moutoussis, Peter Dayan, Joseph M Barnby
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Abstract

Humans need to be on their toes when interacting with competitive others to avoid being taken advantage of. Too much caution out of context can, however, be detrimental and produce false beliefs of intended harm. Here, we offer a formal account of this phenomenon through the lens of Theory of Mind. We simulate agents of different depths of mentalizing within a simple game theoretic paradigm and show how, if aligned well, deep recursive mentalization gives rise to both successful deception as well as reasonable skepticism. However, we also show that if a self is mentalizing too deeply - hyper-mentalizing - false beliefs arise that a partner is trying to trick them maliciously, resulting in a material loss to the self. Importantly, we show that this is only true when hypermentalizing agents believe observed actions are generated intentionally. This theory offers a potential cognitive mechanism for suspiciousness, paranoia, and conspiratorial ideation. Rather than a deficit in Theory of Mind, paranoia may arise from the application of overly strategic thinking to ingenuous behaviour.

Author summary: Interacting competitively requires vigilance to avoid deception. However, excessive caution can have adverse effects, stemming from false beliefs of intentional harm. So far there is no formal cognitive account of what may cause this suspiciousness. Here we present an examination of this phenomenon through the lens of Theory of Mind - the cognitive ability to consider the beliefs, intentions, and desires of others. By simulating interacting computer agents we illustrate how well-aligned agents can give rise to successful deception and justified skepticism. Crucially, we also reveal that overly cautious agents develop false beliefs that an ingenuous partner is attempting malicious trickery, leading to tangible losses. As well as formally defining a plausible mechanism for suspiciousness, paranoia, and conspiratorial thinking, our theory indicates that rather than a deficit in Theory of Mind, paranoia may involve an over-application of strategy to genuine behaviour.

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(认知层次中的(不良)适应性心智化及其与妄想症的联系。
人类在与具有竞争力的他人交往时需要保持警惕,以免被人利用。然而,脱离语境的过度谨慎可能会造成损害,并产生意图伤害的错误信念。在这里,我们通过心智理论的视角对这一现象进行了正式阐述。我们在一个简单的博弈论范式中模拟了不同心智化深度的代理人,并展示了如果配合得当,深度递归心智化是如何既能成功欺骗又能合理怀疑的。然而,我们也证明,如果自我心智化过深--超心智化--就会产生错误的信念,认为伙伴在恶意欺骗自己,从而导致自我遭受物质损失。重要的是,我们证明只有当过度心理化的人认为观察到的行为是有意产生的时候,这种情况才会发生。这一理论为多疑、偏执和阴谋论提供了一种潜在的认知机制。与其说妄想症是心智理论的缺陷,不如说它可能是由于对巧妙的行为应用了过度的战略思维而产生的。然而,过度谨慎可能会产生不良影响,因为人们会错误地认为这是蓄意伤害。迄今为止,还没有一种正式的认知方法来解释导致这种多疑的原因。在这里,我们将通过 "心智理论"--一种考虑他人信念、意图和愿望的认知能力--的视角对这一现象进行研究。通过模拟相互作用的计算机代理,我们说明了相互配合良好的代理是如何成功欺骗和合理怀疑的。最重要的是,我们还揭示了过于谨慎的代理会产生错误的信念,认为狡猾的伙伴正试图恶意欺骗,从而导致实际损失。我们的理论不仅正式定义了多疑、偏执和阴谋论思维的合理机制,还表明偏执可能涉及对真实行为过度应用策略,而不是心智理论的缺陷。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.30
自引率
0.00%
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0
审稿时长
17 weeks
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(Mal)adaptive Mentalizing in the Cognitive Hierarchy, and Its Link to Paranoia. Decision-Making, Pro-variance Biases and Mood-Related Traits. Enhancing Within-Person Estimation of Neurocognition and the Prediction of Externalizing Behaviors in Adolescents. Updating Prospective Self-Efficacy Beliefs About Cardiac Interoception in Anorexia Nervosa: An Experimental and Computational Study. Temporal Dynamics of Uncertainty Cause Anxiety and Avoidance.
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