{"title":"Barrett's paradox of cooperation: A full analytical proof 30 years after","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jeem.2024.103045","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In his seminal paper, Barrett (1994) argues that international environmental agreements (IEAs) are typically not successful, which he coined \"the paradox of cooperation\". If the potential gains from full cooperation would be large, self-enforcing IEAs have low participation and, therefore, cannot achieve much, or, if the potential gains are small, agreements are not important, even though IEAs may enjoy large participation. This message has been reiterated by several subsequent papers. Even though these papers explain the driving forces of the paradox, the analysis of membership in stable agreements and the actual and potential gains from cooperation are still mainly based on simulations. In this paper, we provide a full analytical characterization of all items on which the paradox of cooperation is based.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15763,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069624001190","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In his seminal paper, Barrett (1994) argues that international environmental agreements (IEAs) are typically not successful, which he coined "the paradox of cooperation". If the potential gains from full cooperation would be large, self-enforcing IEAs have low participation and, therefore, cannot achieve much, or, if the potential gains are small, agreements are not important, even though IEAs may enjoy large participation. This message has been reiterated by several subsequent papers. Even though these papers explain the driving forces of the paradox, the analysis of membership in stable agreements and the actual and potential gains from cooperation are still mainly based on simulations. In this paper, we provide a full analytical characterization of all items on which the paradox of cooperation is based.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Environmental Economics and Management publishes theoretical and empirical papers devoted to specific natural resources and environmental issues. For consideration, papers should (1) contain a substantial element embodying the linkage between economic systems and environmental and natural resources systems or (2) be of substantial importance in understanding the management and/or social control of the economy in its relations with the natural environment. Although the general orientation of the journal is toward economics, interdisciplinary papers by researchers in other fields of interest to resource and environmental economists will be welcomed.
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