Redesigning automated market power mitigation in electricity markets

IF 1.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-09-23 DOI:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103108
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Abstract

Electricity markets are prone to the abuse of market power. Several U.S. markets employ algorithms to monitor and mitigate market power abuse in real-time. The performance of automated mitigation procedures is contingent on precise estimates of firms' marginal production costs. Currently, marginal cost is inferred from the past offers of a plant. We present new estimation approaches and compare them to the currently applied benchmark method. We test the performance of all approaches on auction data from the Iberian power market. The results show that our novel approaches outperform the benchmark approach significantly, reducing the mean (median) absolute estimation error from 11.53 (6.08) €/MWh in the benchmark to 4.03 (2.64) €/MWh for our preferred approach. This approach also performs best in our subsequent simulation of mitigation procedures. Here we find large welfare transfers from supplier to buyer surplus as well as a robust overall welfare gain, stemming from both productive and allocative efficiency gains. Our research contributes to accurate monitoring of market power and improved automated mitigation. Although we focus on power markets, our findings are applicable to monitoring of renewable energy tenders or market power surveillance in rail and air traffic.
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重新设计电力市场中的自动市场力量缓解措施
电力市场容易出现滥用市场支配力的现象。美国的一些市场采用算法实时监测和缓解市场支配力滥用。自动缓解程序的性能取决于对企业边际生产成本的精确估算。目前,边际成本是根据工厂过去的报价推断出来的。我们提出了新的估算方法,并将其与目前使用的基准方法进行了比较。我们在伊比利亚电力市场的拍卖数据上测试了所有方法的性能。结果显示,我们的新方法明显优于基准方法,平均(中位数)绝对估计误差从基准方法的 11.53 (6.08) 欧元/兆瓦时减少到我们首选方法的 4.03 (2.64) 欧元/兆瓦时。这种方法在我们随后的缓解程序模拟中也表现最佳。在此,我们发现了从供应方到购买方盈余的大量福利转移,以及源于生产和分配效率提高的稳健的整体福利收益。我们的研究有助于准确监控市场支配力和改进自动缓解措施。虽然我们关注的是电力市场,但我们的研究结果也适用于可再生能源招标的监控或铁路和航空交通的市场支配力监控。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
6.70%
发文量
48
审稿时长
77 days
期刊介绍: The IJIO is an international venture that aims at full coverage of theoretical and empirical questions in industrial organization. This includes classic questions of strategic behavior and market structure. The journal also seeks to publish articles dealing with technological change, internal organization of firms, regulation, antitrust and productivity analysis. We recognize the need to allow for diversity of perspectives and research styles in industrial organization and we encourage submissions in theoretical work, empirical work, and case studies. The journal will also occasionally publish symposia on topical issues.
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