International Journal of Industrial Organization最新文献

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Optimal auctions with sequential arrival: Allowing for re-auction and resale

IF 1.7 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Pub Date : 2025-03-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103158

Xiaoshu Xu

The sequential arrival of bidders is a crucial aspect of real-world auctions, providing the auctioneer with incentives for re-auctioning and bidders with opportunities for resale. This paper investigates the optimality of sequential auctions, focusing on scenarios where the auctioneer can re-auction items and tap into potential future resale demand. Specifically, when bidders arrive in two batches, the auctioneer first conducts an English auction for the initial batch. If unsuccessful, the item is re-auctioned to both batches of bidders; otherwise, the winner can opt to resell to current and future bidders. I characterize the optimal sequential English auctions, noting that the auctioneer's belief about the value distribution of the first batch is necessarily limited after the initial auction fails. The findings demonstrate that, on the optimal reserve price path, the first batch always retains a positive winning probability in the re-auction. Furthermore, I identify conditions under which resale does not occur in equilibrium due to a high optimal reserve price in the initial auction. Thus, when the auctioneer can set optimal reserve prices and access resale demand, resale can be implicitly prohibited. These results provide important policy implications for auctions in both the private and public sectors.

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引用次数: 0

Public procurement as an innovation policy: Where do we stand?

IF 1.7 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Pub Date : 2025-03-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103157

Olga Chiappinelli , Leonardo M. Giuffrida , Giancarlo Spagnolo

Scholars and policymakers have long recognized the potential of public procurement as an industrial policy tool to incentivize innovation. However, it remains unclear to what extent this potential has been realized and what measures should be implemented to maximize performance. This paper surveys the economic literature on public procurement of innovation (PPI) to take stock of this debate. We discuss the existing research on four broad questions: i) Does PPI spur innovation? ii) How should PPI be designed to best spur innovation? iii) What barriers hinder the implementation of PPI? iv) What is the role of PPI in the innovation policy mix? We conclude that PPI can be an effective innovation policy, but that further investigation is needed for a more solid assessment. We highlight the areas where additional research is most needed and discuss policy implications for current global challenges.

引用次数: 0

Keith Cowling and industrial policy

IF 1.7 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Pub Date : 2025-03-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103156

Michael Waterson

The purpose of this short paper is simply to outline and comment upon Keith Cowling's thinking and writings on industrial policy/ industrial strategy, Keith being an early proponent for the pursuit of industrial policy.

引用次数: 0

Start-up acquisitions, venture capital and innovation: A comparative study of Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft

IF 1.7 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103148

Klaus Gugler, Florian Szücs, Ulrich Wohak

We evaluate the impact of big-tech acquisitions on the incentives for venture capital (VC) investment and innovation. Using data on several hundred acquisitions by Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft (GAFAM), we study the evolution of VC investment and patenting in affected technology fields relative to control groups. The results show a clear negative impact on VC investment, while the effect on innovation depends on the acquirer and period. Over time, the treatment effects on both outcomes improve, as GAFAM firms' product and tech-portfolios become more similar. Yet, around 14% of acquisitions impact both metrics negatively.

引用次数: 0

Inertia in the U.S. federal crop insurance market

IF 1.7 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Pub Date : 2025-02-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103149

Xiaodong Du

We document significant inertia in farmers' crop insurance choices using a large panel of farm insurance records. Farmers often retain their previous year's plans, even after substantial shocks. We quantify inertia as the cost of switching plans in a discrete choice framework, incorporating an inertia indicator along with plan-specific attributes such as premiums, subsidies, and expected indemnities. These attributes are constructed based on individual farm characteristics. Our analysis estimates the average switching cost at approximately $10.9 per acre, comparable to the average per-acre premium for the yield insurance plan (APH) at 65% coverage and the revenue insurance plan (CRC) at 55% coverage. Explicit and implicit switching costs, information friction, and inattention contribute to this inertia.

引用次数: 0

Flavorants and addiction: An empirical analysis of cigarette bans and taxation

IF 1.7 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Pub Date : 2025-02-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103147

Jiawei Chen , Colin Reinhardt

We evaluate the proposed FDA menthol cigarette ban using aggregate-level retail data and micro-level household data. The model incorporates addiction and household heterogeneity, with a focus on low-income households and the Black community, who consume menthol cigarettes the most. The ban reduces cigarette usage by 12.6% and the Black smoking rate by 35%, while demand for e-cigarettes and cessation products increases by 4.9% and 1.7%, respectively. A $1.02-per-pack cigarette sales tax is as effective as the menthol cigarette ban in reducing cigarette usage, while resulting in a smaller reduction in consumer surplus across most demographic groups, especially Black Americans. Including non-tobacco flavored e-cigarettes in the ban reduces cigarette consumption similarly, while e-cigarette usage decreases by 46%.

引用次数: 0

Entry deterrence, domino effects and mergers in markets for complements

IF 1.7 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Pub Date : 2025-02-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103145

Paolo Ramezzana

This paper studies entry deterrence through exclusive contracts in markets for complementary components. When two components are produced by independent incumbents that both face entry threats, the incumbents' entry deterrence actions are strategic complements for a broad set of demand functions. As a result, when entry costs are sufficiently similar in the two components, in equilibrium entry is deterred in both components or in none. Thus, policy interventions that focus on promoting entry in a single component can have domino effects that lead to entry in all components. A merger between the incumbents allows for more efficient pricing of the system relative to a bilateral monopoly and, through this channel, increases the joint profits that the incumbents can earn if they deter entry. For intermediate levels of entry costs, this implies that the incumbents deter entry only if they are merged and thus, in an example of an “efficiency offense”, that the merger increases prices and lowers welfare. For sufficiently high entry costs, instead, entry is deterred even without the merger and the only effect of the merger is to lower prices and increase welfare.

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引用次数: 0

Platform-enabled information disclosure

IF 1.7 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Pub Date : 2025-01-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103143

Jacopo Gambato , Martin Peitz

We analyze consumers' voluntary information disclosure in a platform setting. For given consumer participation, the platform and sellers tend to prefer limited disclosure of consumer valuations, in contrast to consumers. With endogenous consumer participation, seller and platform incentives may be misaligned, and sellers may be better off when consumers can disclose their valuations. A regulator acting in the best interest of consumers and/or sellers may want to intervene and force the platform to employ a disclosure technology that enables consumers to voluntarily disclose information from a richer message space.

引用次数: 0

Can nonprofit target-setting mechanisms drive for-profit compliance? Evidence from sodium content

IF 1.7 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Pub Date : 2025-01-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103144

Christian Rojas , Ezgi Cengiz

The 2009 National Salt Reduction Initiative (NSRI) set sodium content targets for packaged food products in the United States. Some manufacturers pledged to meet the NSRI targets by 2014. We quantify the causal effect of the NSRI on sodium content reductions. Our identification of the effect rests on two pillars. First, the NSRI targets were set exogenously as they were determined by public health authorities (rather than firms) and according to criteria that are arguably unrelated to supply or demand factors. Second, the NSRI created unequal incentives for product reformulation: Firms had an incentive to only reformulate products with sodium content above the NSRI target. Furthermore, compliance with the targets implied that a greater sodium reduction was needed for products farther above the targets. Using a kink regression discontinuity design, we show that the NSRI reduced excess sodium content by about 30 percent. Interestingly, we find that the NSRI had a causal effect on firms that declared their pledge to the voluntary program (signatories) as well as on those that did not (non-signatories). We discuss possible reasons for the effectiveness of this target-setting mechanism.

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引用次数: 0

Complex pricing and consumer-side attention

IF 1.7 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Pub Date : 2025-01-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103142

Christian Fischer-Thöne , Alexander Rasch , Tobias Wenzel

This paper analyzes a market in which two horizontally differentiated firms compete by setting menus of two-part tariffs, and some consumers are not informed about the linear per-unit price component. We consider two regulatory interventions that limit firms' ability to price discriminate: (i) diminishing the range of contracts by reducing the number of two-part tariffs offered (which prohibits inter-group price discrimination); and (ii) reducing tariff complexity by abolishing linear fees (which prohibits inter-group and intra-group price discrimination). We characterize the effects of these interventions on firm profits and consumer welfare, and we identify conditions for the optimal regulatory policy. Our results provide insights for the evaluation of policy interventions.

引用次数: 0

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