Optimal Financial Decisions and Pricing Strategies in Competitive Manufacturing Supply Chains

IF 4.6 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management Pub Date : 2024-08-30 DOI:10.1109/TEM.2024.3452590
Seyed Parsa Parvasi;Ata Allah Taleizadeh;Arijit Bhattacharya;Rojin Moradi
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Abstract

This study investigates the impact of financing methods and pricing competition on supply chain operations. It focuses on a domestic manufacturer competing with a foreign competitor to maximize retail market gains, with options for financing including banks, bonds, and crowdfunding. Game-theoretic models are used to explore participants’ behavior in the supply chain, considering three power structures: a Nash game and two Stackelberg games with alternating leadership. Results reveal that domestic manufacturers prefer financing options with flexible interest rates, such as crowdfunding, or low-interest alternatives such as bonds, when facing rising production costs or reduced competitiveness (when the foreign manufacturer holds a leader position). This preference impacts retailers, potentially leading to reduced product prices, benefiting retailers. Also, increasing initial capital prompts the domestic manufacturer to prefer bank methods. Interestingly, a higher budget and quality do not always guarantee higher profitability and can result in additional costs (for instance, in Nash game structure), depending on power structure type and market size. Furthermore, with increased price sensitivity, crowdfunding becomes less viable, leading to a preference for bank and bond financing. This can conflict with retailers’ optimal financial choices, highlighting the complexity of financial decisions in supply chains and their crucial role in global competition.
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竞争性制造供应链中的最佳财务决策和定价策略
本研究探讨了融资方法和定价竞争对供应链运营的影响。研究重点是一家国内制造商与一家国外竞争对手竞争,以实现零售市场收益最大化,融资方式包括银行、债券和众筹。研究采用博弈论模型来探讨供应链中参与者的行为,并考虑了三种权力结构:纳什博弈和两个领导权交替的斯塔克尔伯格博弈。结果显示,国内制造商在面临生产成本上升或竞争力下降(当外国制造商处于领导地位时)时,更倾向于选择利率灵活的融资方案(如众筹)或低息替代方案(如债券)。这种偏好会对零售商产生影响,有可能导致产品降价,使零售商受益。此外,初始资本的增加也会促使国内制造商更倾向于银行方式。有趣的是,较高的预算和质量并不总能保证较高的利润率,还可能导致额外的成本(例如,在纳什博弈结构中),这取决于权力结构类型和市场规模。此外,随着价格敏感度的提高,众筹的可行性也会降低,从而导致对银行和债券融资的偏好。这可能与零售商的最佳金融选择相冲突,突出了供应链中金融决策的复杂性及其在全球竞争中的关键作用。
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来源期刊
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 管理科学-工程:工业
CiteScore
10.30
自引率
19.00%
发文量
604
审稿时长
5.3 months
期刊介绍: Management of technical functions such as research, development, and engineering in industry, government, university, and other settings. Emphasis is on studies carried on within an organization to help in decision making or policy formation for RD&E.
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