Veiled costs, concealed incentives: Rethinking market approaches to address institutional marginalization and reduce vulnerability of artisanal fishers to power abuses in the Peruvian dolphinfish fishery
{"title":"Veiled costs, concealed incentives: Rethinking market approaches to address institutional marginalization and reduce vulnerability of artisanal fishers to power abuses in the Peruvian dolphinfish fishery","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.marpol.2024.106412","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Market-based approaches play a crucial role in promoting seafood sustainability by leveraging market incentives. Typically, these incentives are commonly perceived as closely associated with premium prices or improved market access. As such, arguments around product competitiveness are used by various stakeholders to engage the lower levels of the seafood supply chain in sustainability initiatives. This study presents findings from an analysis of secondary and primary data obtained through a two-tier survey, focusing on the operational costs of Peruvian artisanal dolphinfish fleets and estimating the concealed costs that result from institutional malpractice and coercive transactions from criminal groups. Our analysis reveals that the artisanal fishing sector, due to institutional marginalization facilitated by bureaucratic overburdening, experiences various forms of power abuse. Specifically, we show how the higher the levels of informality of the fleet’s operation, the higher the probability of being subject to unethical behavior. This results in heightened hidden operational costs, which in turn affect the income of vessel owners and fishers. To address these issues, we argue that market-based approaches should build upon the new incentives offered by import-control schemes and anti-Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated regulations, prioritizing actions to alleviate institutional marginalization of fishers. By doing so, responsible companies in the supply chain can effectively reduce legal, economic, and reputational risks while actively tackling the critical factors contributing to power imbalances and the resulting unequal distribution of benefits.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48427,"journal":{"name":"Marine Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Marine Policy","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X2400410X","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Market-based approaches play a crucial role in promoting seafood sustainability by leveraging market incentives. Typically, these incentives are commonly perceived as closely associated with premium prices or improved market access. As such, arguments around product competitiveness are used by various stakeholders to engage the lower levels of the seafood supply chain in sustainability initiatives. This study presents findings from an analysis of secondary and primary data obtained through a two-tier survey, focusing on the operational costs of Peruvian artisanal dolphinfish fleets and estimating the concealed costs that result from institutional malpractice and coercive transactions from criminal groups. Our analysis reveals that the artisanal fishing sector, due to institutional marginalization facilitated by bureaucratic overburdening, experiences various forms of power abuse. Specifically, we show how the higher the levels of informality of the fleet’s operation, the higher the probability of being subject to unethical behavior. This results in heightened hidden operational costs, which in turn affect the income of vessel owners and fishers. To address these issues, we argue that market-based approaches should build upon the new incentives offered by import-control schemes and anti-Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated regulations, prioritizing actions to alleviate institutional marginalization of fishers. By doing so, responsible companies in the supply chain can effectively reduce legal, economic, and reputational risks while actively tackling the critical factors contributing to power imbalances and the resulting unequal distribution of benefits.
期刊介绍:
Marine Policy is the leading journal of ocean policy studies. It offers researchers, analysts and policy makers a unique combination of analyses in the principal social science disciplines relevant to the formulation of marine policy. Major articles are contributed by specialists in marine affairs, including marine economists and marine resource managers, political scientists, marine scientists, international lawyers, geographers and anthropologists. Drawing on their expertise and research, the journal covers: international, regional and national marine policies; institutional arrangements for the management and regulation of marine activities, including fisheries and shipping; conflict resolution; marine pollution and environment; conservation and use of marine resources. Regular features of Marine Policy include research reports, conference reports and reports on current developments to keep readers up-to-date with the latest developments and research in ocean affairs.