Long-term tax strategy and corporate acquisition payment structure: An analysis based on the book-tax tradeoff theory

IF 2.9 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-12-01 Epub Date: 2024-09-23 DOI:10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100442
K. Hung Chan , Miao He , Phyllis Lai Lan Mo , Weiyin Zhang
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Abstract

This study examines the relationship between corporate acquirers’ long-term tax strategy (i.e., past behavior) and their subsequent choice of an acquisition payment method (i.e., future behavior) based on a book-tax tradeoff analysis. We find that acquirers with a high (low) level of long-term tax avoidance are more likely to have cash (stock)-financed acquisitions. Political influence attenuates the significance of the above relationship. Among the acquirers who use cash-financed payment method, those who are less tax aggressive tend to include debt to finance their acquisitions, suggesting that debt and non-debt tax shields are substitutes for each other in acquisitions.
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长期税收战略与企业收购支付结构:基于账面税收权衡理论的分析
本研究基于账面-税收权衡分析,探讨了企业收购方的长期税收策略(即过去行为)与其随后选择的收购支付方式(即未来行为)之间的关系。我们发现,长期避税水平高(低)的收购方更倾向于现金(股票)融资收购。政治影响削弱了上述关系的重要性。在采用现金融资支付方式的收购方中,那些税收激进程度较低的收购方倾向于采用债务融资方式进行收购,这表明债务和非债务税盾在收购中是相互替代的。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
3.00%
发文量
24
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