Intentions and Inquiry

IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY MIND Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI:10.1093/mind/fzae056
Daniel C Friedman
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Abstract

This paper defends the Intention Account of Individual Inquiry. On this account, inquiry is best understood by appeal to a ‘question-directed intention’ (QDI), an intention to answer a question broadly construed. This account’s core commitments help meet recent challenges plaguing extant approaches to characterizing inquiry. First, QDIs are the type of mental state central to inquiry, not attitudes like curiosity or wonder. Second, holding a QDI towards a question and acting in service of it constitutes the start of inquiry. Third, controversial norms which mandate a rational inquirer’s ignorance towards the answer to her question can be reformulated and defended by appeal to rational constraints on intention. Fourth, instrumental pressures inquirers face are the standard pressures of plan-rationality. In defending these theses, I show that the Intention Account provides compelling explanations to standing challenges, in ways competitors cannot. It does so by advancing understanding of how our epistemic and practical agency are intertwined.
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意图与探索
本文为 "个人探究的意图论"(Intention Account of Individual Inquiry)辩护。根据这一观点,对探究的最佳理解是诉诸 "问题导向意图"(QDI),即广义上回答问题的意图。该理论的核心承诺有助于应对近期困扰现有研究方法的挑战。首先,QDI 是探究的核心心理状态类型,而不是好奇心或惊奇等态度。其次,对一个问题持有 QDI 并为之采取行动是探究的开始。第三,有争议的规范规定理性探究者对问题的答案一无所知,这些规范可以通过诉诸对意图的理性约束来重新表述和辩护。第四,探究者面临的工具性压力是计划理性的标准压力。在对这些论点进行辩护时,我表明意图论能够以竞争者所无法比拟的方式为长期挑战提供令人信服的解释。它是通过推进对我们的认识论与实践机构如何相互交织的理解而做到这一点的。
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来源期刊
MIND
MIND PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
3.10
自引率
5.60%
发文量
47
期刊介绍: Mind has long been a leading journal in philosophy. For well over 100 years it has presented the best of cutting edge thought from epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. Mind continues its tradition of excellence today. Mind has always enjoyed a strong reputation for the high standards established by its editors and receives around 350 submissions each year. The editor seeks advice from a large number of expert referees, including members of the network of Associate Editors and his international advisers. Mind is published quarterly.
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