首页 > 最新文献

MIND最新文献

英文 中文
Freedom, Omniscience and the Contingent A Priori 自由、全知全能与先验权变
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-21 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae058
Fabio Lampert
One of the major challenges in the philosophy of religion is theological fatalism — roughly, the claim that divine omniscience is incompatible with free will. In this article, I present new reasons to be sceptical of what I consider to be the strongest argument for theological fatalism. First, I argue that divine foreknowledge is not necessary for an argument against free will if we take into account divine knowledge of contingent a priori truths. Second, I show that this argument can be generalized so that ordinary human knowledge of contingent a priori truths also leads to an argument against free will. This, I believe, results in an absurd conclusion that is unacceptable to both theists and non-theists. But if there is something wrong with this argument, there is something wrong, too, with the argument for theological fatalism. Although there is a range of possible responses, I suggest that the core issue in all cases is a closure principle — specifically, the principle that ‘no choice about’ is closed under entailment (or strict implication).
神学宿命论是宗教哲学面临的主要挑战之一--粗略地说,神的全知全能与自由意志不相容。在本文中,我提出了新的理由来怀疑我认为是神学宿命论最有力的论据。首先,我认为,如果我们考虑到神对或然先验真理的知识,那么神的预知就不是反对自由意志的论证所必需的。其次,我证明这一论证可以推广到普通人对或然先验真理的知识也可以导致反对自由意志的论证。我认为,这会导致有神论者和非有神论者都无法接受的荒谬结论。但是,如果这个论证有问题,那么神学宿命论的论证也有问题。虽然有一系列可能的回应,但我认为所有情况下的核心问题都是封闭原则--具体来说,"没有选择 "在蕴含(或严格蕴含)下是封闭的。
{"title":"Freedom, Omniscience and the Contingent A Priori","authors":"Fabio Lampert","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae058","url":null,"abstract":"One of the major challenges in the philosophy of religion is theological fatalism — roughly, the claim that divine omniscience is incompatible with free will. In this article, I present new reasons to be sceptical of what I consider to be the strongest argument for theological fatalism. First, I argue that divine foreknowledge is not necessary for an argument against free will if we take into account divine knowledge of contingent a priori truths. Second, I show that this argument can be generalized so that ordinary human knowledge of contingent a priori truths also leads to an argument against free will. This, I believe, results in an absurd conclusion that is unacceptable to both theists and non-theists. But if there is something wrong with this argument, there is something wrong, too, with the argument for theological fatalism. Although there is a range of possible responses, I suggest that the core issue in all cases is a closure principle — specifically, the principle that ‘no choice about’ is closed under entailment (or strict implication).","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142487057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Conceptual Decolonization, Conceptual Justice, and Religious Concepts 概念非殖民化、概念正义和宗教概念
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-17 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae053
Mikel Burley
Calls for decolonization are on the rise in social and academic life, but ‘decolonization’ can mean various things. This article expounds and critically evaluates the programme of conceptual decolonization, chiefly as promulgated in relation to African philosophy by Kwasi Wiredu. The programme involves both resisting the unreflective acceptance of non-indigenous concepts and constructively utilizing indigenous conceptual resources to address philosophical questions. Examining recent objections from Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò and giving particular attention to Wiredu’s treatment of religious concepts, I concur with Wiredu that conceptual decolonization can encourage conceptual enlargement but argue that care is needed to avoid oversimplifying the non-indigenous concepts that are subjected to scrutiny.
非殖民化的呼声在社会和学术界日益高涨,但 "非殖民化 "的含义却多种多样。本文阐述并批判性地评价了概念非殖民化方案,主要是夸西-威雷杜在非洲哲学方面提出的方案。该计划既包括抵制不加反思地接受非本土概念,也包括建设性地利用本土概念资源来解决哲学问题。通过研究 Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò 最近提出的反对意见,并特别关注 Wiredu 对宗教概念的处理,我同意 Wiredu 的观点,即概念的非殖民化可以鼓励概念的扩展,但认为需要注意避免过度简化接受审查的非本土概念。
{"title":"Conceptual Decolonization, Conceptual Justice, and Religious Concepts","authors":"Mikel Burley","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae053","url":null,"abstract":"Calls for decolonization are on the rise in social and academic life, but ‘decolonization’ can mean various things. This article expounds and critically evaluates the programme of conceptual decolonization, chiefly as promulgated in relation to African philosophy by Kwasi Wiredu. The programme involves both resisting the unreflective acceptance of non-indigenous concepts and constructively utilizing indigenous conceptual resources to address philosophical questions. Examining recent objections from Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò and giving particular attention to Wiredu’s treatment of religious concepts, I concur with Wiredu that conceptual decolonization can encourage conceptual enlargement but argue that care is needed to avoid oversimplifying the non-indigenous concepts that are subjected to scrutiny.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"78 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142448157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Symmetry, Invariance, and Imprecise Probability 对称性、不变性和不精确概率
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-16 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae048
Zachary Goodsell, Jacob M Nebel
It is tempting to think that a process of choosing a point at random from the surface of a sphere can be probabilistically symmetric, in the sense that any two regions of the sphere which differ by a rotation are equally likely to include the chosen point. Isaacs, Hájek and Hawthorne (2022) argue from such symmetry principles and the mathematical paradoxes of measure to the existence of imprecise chances and the rationality of imprecise credences. Williamson (2007) has argued from a related symmetry principle to the failure of probabilistic regularity. We contend that these arguments fail, because they rely on auxiliary assumptions about probability which are inconsistent with symmetry to begin with. We argue, moreover, that symmetry should be rejected in light of this inconsistency, and because it has implausible decision-theoretic implications. The weaker principle of probabilistic invariance says that the probabilistic comparison of any two regions is unchanged by rotations of the sphere. This principle supports a more compelling argument for imprecise probability. We show, however, that invariance is incompatible with mundane judgements about what is probable. Ultimately, we find reason to be suspicious of the application of principles like symmetry and invariance to non-measurable regions.
我们很容易想到,从球体表面随机选择一个点的过程在概率上是对称的,即球体上任何两个相差一圈的区域都同样有可能包含所选的点。Isaacs、Hájek 和 Hawthorne(2022 年)从这种对称性原理和度量衡的数学悖论出发,论证了不精确机会的存在和不精确信任的合理性。Williamson(2007)从相关的对称性原理论证了概率规律性的失败。我们认为这些论证都失败了,因为它们依赖于关于概率的辅助假设,而这些假设从一开始就与对称性不一致。此外,我们还认为,鉴于这种不一致性,对称性应该被摒弃,因为它具有难以置信的决策理论含义。较弱的概率不变性原则认为,任何两个区域的概率比较都不会因球体的旋转而改变。这一原则为不精确概率提供了更有说服力的论据。然而,我们表明,不变性与关于什么是概率的世俗判断是不相容的。最终,我们发现有理由怀疑对称性和不变性等原理是否适用于不可测量的区域。
{"title":"Symmetry, Invariance, and Imprecise Probability","authors":"Zachary Goodsell, Jacob M Nebel","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae048","url":null,"abstract":"It is tempting to think that a process of choosing a point at random from the surface of a sphere can be probabilistically symmetric, in the sense that any two regions of the sphere which differ by a rotation are equally likely to include the chosen point. Isaacs, Hájek and Hawthorne (2022) argue from such symmetry principles and the mathematical paradoxes of measure to the existence of imprecise chances and the rationality of imprecise credences. Williamson (2007) has argued from a related symmetry principle to the failure of probabilistic regularity. We contend that these arguments fail, because they rely on auxiliary assumptions about probability which are inconsistent with symmetry to begin with. We argue, moreover, that symmetry should be rejected in light of this inconsistency, and because it has implausible decision-theoretic implications. The weaker principle of probabilistic invariance says that the probabilistic comparison of any two regions is unchanged by rotations of the sphere. This principle supports a more compelling argument for imprecise probability. We show, however, that invariance is incompatible with mundane judgements about what is probable. Ultimately, we find reason to be suspicious of the application of principles like symmetry and invariance to non-measurable regions.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"76 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142444490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
KK is Wrong Because We Say So KK 错了,因为我们这么说
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-15 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae050
Simon Goldstein, John Hawthorne
This paper offers a new argument against the KK thesis, which says that if you know p, then you know that you know p. We argue that KK is inconsistent with the fact that anyone denies the KK thesis: imagine that Dudley says he knows p but that he does not have 100 iterations of knowledge about p. If KK were true, Dudley would know that he has 100 iterations of knowledge about p, and so he wouldn’t deny that he did. We consider several epicycles, and also explore whether the argument type also challenges other structural conditions on knowledge, such as closure under deduction.
本文针对KK论题提出了一个新的论证,KK论题说,如果你知道p,那么你就知道你知道p。我们认为KK论题与任何人否认KK论题的事实不一致:设想达德利说他知道p,但他没有关于p的100次知识迭代。如果KK是真的,达德利就会知道他有关于p的100次知识迭代,因此他就不会否认他有。我们考虑了几种外循环,还探讨了该论证类型是否也挑战了知识的其他结构条件,如演绎下的封闭性。
{"title":"KK is Wrong Because We Say So","authors":"Simon Goldstein, John Hawthorne","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae050","url":null,"abstract":"This paper offers a new argument against the KK thesis, which says that if you know p, then you know that you know p. We argue that KK is inconsistent with the fact that anyone denies the KK thesis: imagine that Dudley says he knows p but that he does not have 100 iterations of knowledge about p. If KK were true, Dudley would know that he has 100 iterations of knowledge about p, and so he wouldn’t deny that he did. We consider several epicycles, and also explore whether the argument type also challenges other structural conditions on knowledge, such as closure under deduction.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142440156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Not Quite Yet a Hazy Limbo of Mystery: Intuition in Russell’s An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry 尚不完全是朦胧的迷雾:罗素《几何基础论》中的直觉
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-08 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae041
Tyke Nunez
I argue that in Bertrand Russell’s An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry (1897), his forms of externality serve the same fundamental role in grounding the possibility of geometry that Immanuel Kant’s forms of intuition serve in grounding geometry in his critical philosophy. Specifically, both provide knowledge of bare numerical difference, where we have no concept of this difference. Because geometry deals with such conceptually homogeneous magnitudes and their composition on both accounts, forms of intuition or externality (respectively) are at its foundation.
我认为,在伯特兰-罗素的《几何学基础论》(1897 年)中,他的外在性形式在几何学可能性的基础上发挥了与伊曼努尔-康德的直观形式在其批判哲学中在几何学基础上发挥的相同的基本作用。具体地说,两者都提供了关于赤裸裸的数字差异的知识,而我们却没有关于这种差异的概念。由于几何学处理的是这种概念上同质的量及其构成,因此直观或外在性(分别)的形式是几何学的基础。
{"title":"Not Quite Yet a Hazy Limbo of Mystery: Intuition in Russell’s An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry","authors":"Tyke Nunez","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae041","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that in Bertrand Russell’s An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry (1897), his forms of externality serve the same fundamental role in grounding the possibility of geometry that Immanuel Kant’s forms of intuition serve in grounding geometry in his critical philosophy. Specifically, both provide knowledge of bare numerical difference, where we have no concept of this difference. Because geometry deals with such conceptually homogeneous magnitudes and their composition on both accounts, forms of intuition or externality (respectively) are at its foundation.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142386244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intentions and Inquiry 意图与探索
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae056
Daniel C Friedman
This paper defends the Intention Account of Individual Inquiry. On this account, inquiry is best understood by appeal to a ‘question-directed intention’ (QDI), an intention to answer a question broadly construed. This account’s core commitments help meet recent challenges plaguing extant approaches to characterizing inquiry. First, QDIs are the type of mental state central to inquiry, not attitudes like curiosity or wonder. Second, holding a QDI towards a question and acting in service of it constitutes the start of inquiry. Third, controversial norms which mandate a rational inquirer’s ignorance towards the answer to her question can be reformulated and defended by appeal to rational constraints on intention. Fourth, instrumental pressures inquirers face are the standard pressures of plan-rationality. In defending these theses, I show that the Intention Account provides compelling explanations to standing challenges, in ways competitors cannot. It does so by advancing understanding of how our epistemic and practical agency are intertwined.
本文为 "个人探究的意图论"(Intention Account of Individual Inquiry)辩护。根据这一观点,对探究的最佳理解是诉诸 "问题导向意图"(QDI),即广义上回答问题的意图。该理论的核心承诺有助于应对近期困扰现有研究方法的挑战。首先,QDI 是探究的核心心理状态类型,而不是好奇心或惊奇等态度。其次,对一个问题持有 QDI 并为之采取行动是探究的开始。第三,有争议的规范规定理性探究者对问题的答案一无所知,这些规范可以通过诉诸对意图的理性约束来重新表述和辩护。第四,探究者面临的工具性压力是计划理性的标准压力。在对这些论点进行辩护时,我表明意图论能够以竞争者所无法比拟的方式为长期挑战提供令人信服的解释。它是通过推进对我们的认识论与实践机构如何相互交织的理解而做到这一点的。
{"title":"Intentions and Inquiry","authors":"Daniel C Friedman","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae056","url":null,"abstract":"This paper defends the Intention Account of Individual Inquiry. On this account, inquiry is best understood by appeal to a ‘question-directed intention’ (QDI), an intention to answer a question broadly construed. This account’s core commitments help meet recent challenges plaguing extant approaches to characterizing inquiry. First, QDIs are the type of mental state central to inquiry, not attitudes like curiosity or wonder. Second, holding a QDI towards a question and acting in service of it constitutes the start of inquiry. Third, controversial norms which mandate a rational inquirer’s ignorance towards the answer to her question can be reformulated and defended by appeal to rational constraints on intention. Fourth, instrumental pressures inquirers face are the standard pressures of plan-rationality. In defending these theses, I show that the Intention Account provides compelling explanations to standing challenges, in ways competitors cannot. It does so by advancing understanding of how our epistemic and practical agency are intertwined.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142384026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On Algebra Relativisation 关于代数相对化
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-09-20 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae052
Chloé de Canson
Katie Steele and H. Orri Stefánsson argue that, to reflect an agent’s limited awareness, the algebra of propositions on which that agent’s credences are defined should be relativised to their awareness state. I argue that this produces insurmountable difficulties. But the project of relativising the agent’s algebra to reflect their partial perspective need not be abandoned: the algebra can be relativised, not to the agent’s awareness state, but to what we might call their subjective modality.
凯蒂-斯蒂尔(Katie Steele)和奥里-斯特凡松(H. Orri Stefánsson)认为,为了反映代理人的有限意识,界定代理人可信度的命题代数应相对于其意识状态。我认为这会带来难以克服的困难。但是,将代理人的代数相对化以反映其片面视角的计划并不需要放弃:代数可以相对化,不是与代理人的意识状态相对化,而是与我们可以称之为其主观模态的东西相对化。
{"title":"On Algebra Relativisation","authors":"Chloé de Canson","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae052","url":null,"abstract":"Katie Steele and H. Orri Stefánsson argue that, to reflect an agent’s limited awareness, the algebra of propositions on which that agent’s credences are defined should be relativised to their awareness state. I argue that this produces insurmountable difficulties. But the project of relativising the agent’s algebra to reflect their partial perspective need not be abandoned: the algebra can be relativised, not to the agent’s awareness state, but to what we might call their subjective modality.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142306394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Practical Knowledge and the Structural Challenge 实用知识与结构性挑战
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-09-18 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae051
Lucy Campbell
Elizabeth Anscombe characterised practical knowledge as knowledge ‘in intention’. As Anscombe recognised, accepting this view involves rejecting certain basic orthodox epistemological assumptions. But even once this is done, a challenge remains for a conception of practical knowledge as knowledge ‘in intention’. For while practical knowledge would appear to be a kind of propositional knowledge, intentions would appear to be a kind of non-propositional attitude. I call this the ‘Structural Challenge’ for an intention-based account of practical knowledge. After rejecting two suggested responses – one which views intentions as propositional attitudes; one which views practical knowledge as non-propositional knowledge – I offer my own solution by showing how simply having and carrying out an intention to φ will ordinarily meet a plausible neutral condition on propositional knowledge. Knowing a fact will in general involve being mentally related to it via a successful exercise of relevant concepts. The account I develop turns on viewing a person’s carrying out an intention to φ as their constituting the fact that they are φ-ing, through a practical exercise of their concept of φ-ing. The resulting account sheds light both on the analogies, and on the crucial formal differences, between practical and theoretical knowledge.
伊丽莎白-安斯科姆(Elizabeth Anscombe)将实践知识描述为 "意图中 "的知识。正如安斯科姆所认识到的,接受这一观点需要摒弃某些基本的正统认识论假设。但是,即使这样做了,实践知识作为 "意向中 "的知识这一概念仍然面临挑战。因为实践知识似乎是一种命题知识,而意图似乎是一种非命题态度。我把这称为对基于意图的实践知识论的 "结构性挑战"。在拒绝了两种建议的回应--一种将意图视为命题态度;一种将实践知识视为非命题知识--之后,我提出了自己的解决方案,说明了如何简单地拥有并执行对φ的意图通常会满足对命题知识的一个可信的中性条件。一般来说,了解一个事实将涉及通过成功运用相关概念而在精神上与之相关。我的解释是把一个人对φ的意向视为他们通过对φ-ing概念的实际运用而构成了他们正在φ-ing的事实。由此得出的论述既揭示了实践知识与理论知识之间的类比关系,也揭示了两者之间重要的形式差异。
{"title":"Practical Knowledge and the Structural Challenge","authors":"Lucy Campbell","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae051","url":null,"abstract":"Elizabeth Anscombe characterised practical knowledge as knowledge ‘in intention’. As Anscombe recognised, accepting this view involves rejecting certain basic orthodox epistemological assumptions. But even once this is done, a challenge remains for a conception of practical knowledge as knowledge ‘in intention’. For while practical knowledge would appear to be a kind of propositional knowledge, intentions would appear to be a kind of non-propositional attitude. I call this the ‘Structural Challenge’ for an intention-based account of practical knowledge. After rejecting two suggested responses – one which views intentions as propositional attitudes; one which views practical knowledge as non-propositional knowledge – I offer my own solution by showing how simply having and carrying out an intention to φ will ordinarily meet a plausible neutral condition on propositional knowledge. Knowing a fact will in general involve being mentally related to it via a successful exercise of relevant concepts. The account I develop turns on viewing a person’s carrying out an intention to φ as their constituting the fact that they are φ-ing, through a practical exercise of their concept of φ-ing. The resulting account sheds light both on the analogies, and on the crucial formal differences, between practical and theoretical knowledge.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142245470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Six Roles for Inclination 倾向的六个角色
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-09-11 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae047
Zach Barnett
Initially, you judge that p. You then learn that most experts disagree. All things considered, you believe that the experts are probably right. Still, p continues to seem right to you, in some sense. You don’t yet see what, if anything, is wrong with your original reasoning. In such a case, we’ll say that you are ‘inclined’ toward p. This paper explores various roles that this state of inclination can play, both within epistemology and more broadly. Specifically, it will be argued that: (i) inclinations can promote the accuracy of inquiring groups; (ii) they can support rational participation within philosophy despite pervasive disagreement; (iii) they allow us to make sense of an important way in which two people can continue to disagree even after they ‘conciliate’; (iv) inclinations carry information about individuals’ independent judgments and for this reason must be accounted for when updating on the opinions of others; (v) inclinations are connected to understanding in a way that belief is not; (vi) and awareness of the inclination-belief distinction enables us to respond to a provocative challenge purporting to show that critical thinking, or ‘thinking for oneself’, typically reduces expected accuracy and hence should be discouraged.
起初,你判断 p 是正确的,但后来你发现大多数专家都不同意。综合考虑后,你认为专家们可能是对的。尽管如此,在某种意义上,你仍然认为 p 是正确的。你还不知道你原来的推理有什么问题。在这种情况下,我们会说你 "倾向于 "p。本文将探讨这种倾向状态在认识论和更广义的认识论中可能扮演的各种角色。具体来说,本文将论证以下几点:(i) 倾向可以提高探究群体的准确性;(ii) 倾向可以支持哲学内部的理性参与,尽管分歧普遍存在;(iii) 倾向可以让我们理解两个人在 "和解 "之后仍可能继续存在分歧的一种重要方式;(iv) 倾向带有关于个人独立判断的信息,因此在更新他人观点时必须考虑到这一点;(vi) 意识到倾向与信念之间的区别,我们就能应对一个挑衅性的挑战,这个挑战声称批判性思维或 "为自己思考 "通常会降低预期的准确性,因此应予以阻止。
{"title":"Six Roles for Inclination","authors":"Zach Barnett","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae047","url":null,"abstract":"Initially, you judge that p. You then learn that most experts disagree. All things considered, you believe that the experts are probably right. Still, p continues to seem right to you, in some sense. You don’t yet see what, if anything, is wrong with your original reasoning. In such a case, we’ll say that you are ‘inclined’ toward p. This paper explores various roles that this state of inclination can play, both within epistemology and more broadly. Specifically, it will be argued that: (i) inclinations can promote the accuracy of inquiring groups; (ii) they can support rational participation within philosophy despite pervasive disagreement; (iii) they allow us to make sense of an important way in which two people can continue to disagree even after they ‘conciliate’; (iv) inclinations carry information about individuals’ independent judgments and for this reason must be accounted for when updating on the opinions of others; (v) inclinations are connected to understanding in a way that belief is not; (vi) and awareness of the inclination-belief distinction enables us to respond to a provocative challenge purporting to show that critical thinking, or ‘thinking for oneself’, typically reduces expected accuracy and hence should be discouraged.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142171399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bigger, Badder Bugs 更大、更坏的虫子
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-09-02 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae039
Benjamin A Levinstein, Jack Spencer
In this paper we motivate the ‘principles of trust’, chance-credence principles that are strictly stronger than the New Principle yet strictly weaker than the Principal Principle, and argue, by proving some limitative results, that the principles of trust conflict with Humean Supervenience.
在本文中,我们提出了 "信任原则",即严格强于 "新原则 "但又严格弱于 "主原则 "的机会信任原则,并通过证明一些限制性结果,论证了信任原则与休谟超验性的冲突。
{"title":"Bigger, Badder Bugs","authors":"Benjamin A Levinstein, Jack Spencer","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae039","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we motivate the ‘principles of trust’, chance-credence principles that are strictly stronger than the New Principle yet strictly weaker than the Principal Principle, and argue, by proving some limitative results, that the principles of trust conflict with Humean Supervenience.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142117981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
期刊
MIND
全部 Acc. Chem. Res. ACS Applied Bio Materials ACS Appl. Electron. Mater. ACS Appl. Energy Mater. ACS Appl. Mater. Interfaces ACS Appl. Nano Mater. ACS Appl. Polym. Mater. ACS BIOMATER-SCI ENG ACS Catal. ACS Cent. Sci. ACS Chem. Biol. ACS Chemical Health & Safety ACS Chem. Neurosci. ACS Comb. Sci. ACS Earth Space Chem. ACS Energy Lett. ACS Infect. Dis. ACS Macro Lett. ACS Mater. Lett. ACS Med. Chem. Lett. ACS Nano ACS Omega ACS Photonics ACS Sens. ACS Sustainable Chem. Eng. ACS Synth. Biol. Anal. Chem. BIOCHEMISTRY-US Bioconjugate Chem. BIOMACROMOLECULES Chem. Res. Toxicol. Chem. Rev. Chem. Mater. CRYST GROWTH DES ENERG FUEL Environ. Sci. Technol. Environ. Sci. Technol. Lett. Eur. J. Inorg. Chem. IND ENG CHEM RES Inorg. Chem. J. Agric. Food. Chem. J. Chem. Eng. Data J. Chem. Educ. J. Chem. Inf. Model. J. Chem. Theory Comput. J. Med. Chem. J. Nat. Prod. J PROTEOME RES J. Am. Chem. Soc. LANGMUIR MACROMOLECULES Mol. Pharmaceutics Nano Lett. Org. Lett. ORG PROCESS RES DEV ORGANOMETALLICS J. Org. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. A J. Phys. Chem. B J. Phys. Chem. C J. Phys. Chem. Lett. Analyst Anal. Methods Biomater. Sci. Catal. Sci. Technol. Chem. Commun. Chem. Soc. Rev. CHEM EDUC RES PRACT CRYSTENGCOMM Dalton Trans. Energy Environ. Sci. ENVIRON SCI-NANO ENVIRON SCI-PROC IMP ENVIRON SCI-WAT RES Faraday Discuss. Food Funct. Green Chem. Inorg. Chem. Front. Integr. Biol. J. Anal. At. Spectrom. J. Mater. Chem. A J. Mater. Chem. B J. Mater. Chem. C Lab Chip Mater. Chem. Front. Mater. Horiz. MEDCHEMCOMM Metallomics Mol. Biosyst. Mol. Syst. Des. Eng. Nanoscale Nanoscale Horiz. Nat. Prod. Rep. New J. Chem. Org. Biomol. Chem. Org. Chem. Front. PHOTOCH PHOTOBIO SCI PCCP Polym. Chem.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1