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How to Be a Prudential Expressivist 如何成为一个审慎的表现主义者
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2025-01-14 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae072
James L D Brown
This paper examines the prospects for an expressivist theory of prudential thought and discussion, or thought and discussion about what is good for us or what makes our lives go well. It is becoming increasingly common to view prudential thought and discussion as a kind of normative thought and discussion. If this is right, then expressivism, like any other meta-normative view, must be able to explain prudential thought and discussion. However, existing expressivist theories offer no such explanation and lack the resources to construct one. I argue that the best strategy for expressivists is to adopt a fitting attitudes account of prudential concepts. More specifically, I propose that expressivists adopt the rational care theory of well-being, according to which claims about what is good for a person are equivalent to claims about what it is rational to want for that person insofar as one cares for them. In doing so, I defend the rational care theory against its most pressing objection and argue that the view provides an independently attractive account of prudential thought and discussion that fits well with the expressivist’s aim to explain normative thought and discussion in terms of its distinctive practical function.
本文探讨了审慎思考和讨论的表现主义理论的前景,或思考和讨论什么对我们有益或什么使我们的生活变得美好。将审慎的思考和讨论视为一种规范性的思考和讨论正变得越来越普遍。如果这是正确的,那么表现主义,就像任何其他元规范观点一样,必须能够解释审慎的思想和讨论。然而,现有的表现主义理论并没有提供这样的解释,也缺乏资源来构建这样的解释。我认为表现主义者的最佳策略是对审慎的概念采取恰当的态度。更具体地说,我建议表现主义者采用幸福的理性关怀理论,根据该理论,关于什么对一个人有益的主张,等同于关于一个人在关心他们的情况下想要什么是理性的主张。在这样做的过程中,我为理性关怀理论辩护,反对其最紧迫的反对意见,并辩称,这种观点提供了一种独立的、有吸引力的审慎思想和讨论的描述,非常符合表现主义者的目标,即根据其独特的实践功能来解释规范性思想和讨论。
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引用次数: 0
Essence Facts and the Source of Normativity 本质事实与规范性的源头
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2025-01-05 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae070
Umut Baysan
What is the source of normativity? According to Bengson, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2023), we can answer this question by identifying non-normative grounds of fundamental normative facts. To illustrate how this can be achieved, they argue that facts concerning essences of normative properties are non-normative facts, and such facts can be seen as non-normative grounds of fundamental normative facts. I argue that this strategy is misguided. First, explanations citing essence facts about normative properties are poor answers to the question of the source of normativity. Second, it is not clear if such facts are non-normative in the relevant sense. Along the way, I address questions about what it is to be a normative fact and relate the implications of this discussion to general issues about metaphysical explanation in meta-normativity.
规范性的来源是什么?根据Bengson、Cuneo和Shafer-Landau(2023)的观点,我们可以通过识别基本规范性事实的非规范性依据来回答这个问题。为了说明这是如何实现的,他们认为,关于规范性属性的本质的事实是非规范性事实,这些事实可以被视为基本规范性事实的非规范性依据。我认为这种策略是错误的。首先,引用关于规范性属性的本质事实的解释是对规范性来源问题的糟糕回答。其次,不清楚这些事实在相关意义上是否是非规范性的。在此过程中,我提出了关于什么是规范事实的问题,并将这一讨论的含义与元规范性中形而上学解释的一般问题联系起来。
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引用次数: 0
A Universal Money Pump for the Myopic, Naive, and Minimally Sophisticated 为短视、天真和不太成熟的人提供的通用货币泵
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-12-21 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae061
Johan E Gustafsson
The money-pump argument aims to show that cyclic preferences are irrational. The argument can be based on a number of different exploitation schemes that vary in what needs to be assumed about the agent. The Standard Money Pump works for myopic and naive agents, but not for sophisticated agents who use backward induction. The Upfront Money Pump works for sophisticated agents, but not for myopic or naive agents. In this paper, I present a new money pump, the Universal Money Pump, that works for myopic, naive, and sophisticated agents. Moreover, the Universal Money Pump (just like the Upfront Money Pump) also works for minimally sophisticated agents who need not assume that they will choose rationally at nodes that can only be reached by irrational choices. This enables an argument that rational preferences are acyclic, which is based on weaker assumptions about dynamic rationality than existing money-pump arguments.
货币抽水马桶论证的目的在于说明周期性偏好是不合理的。该论证可以基于许多不同的利用方案,这些方案对代理人的假设各不相同。标准资金泵适用于近视和幼稚的代理人,但不适用于使用逆向归纳法的成熟代理人。预付资金泵适用于复杂的代理,但不适用于近视或幼稚的代理。在本文中,我提出了一种新的 "货币泵"--"通用货币泵",它适用于近视、幼稚和复杂的代理人。此外,通用资金泵(就像预付资金泵一样)也适用于最低程度的成熟代理人,他们无需假定自己会在只能通过非理性选择才能到达的节点上做出理性选择。这使得理性偏好是非周期性的论证成为可能,而这种论证所基于的动态理性假设比现有的货币泵论证要弱。
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引用次数: 0
Benardete Paradoxes, Causal Finitism, and the Unsatisfiable Pair Diagnosis 贝纳德悖论、因果有限论与不可满足配对诊断
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-11-27 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae057
Joseph C Schmid, Alex Malpass
We examine two competing solutions to Benardete paradoxes: causal finitism, according to which nothing can have infinitely many causes, and the unsatisfiable pair diagnosis (UPD), according to which such paradoxes are logically impossible and no metaphysical thesis need be adopted to avoid them. We argue that the UPD enjoys notable theoretical advantages over causal finitism. Causal finitists, however, have levelled two main objections to the UPD. First, they urge that the UPD requires positing a ‘mysterious force’ that prevents paradoxes from arising. Since such a force is implausible, the UPD is in trouble. Second, they employ recombination or patchwork principles to argue that paradoxical situations would be possible if causal finitism were false. Since such situations are not possible, causal finitism is true, and so a substantive metaphysical thesis is needed to avoid the paradoxes. We argue that the UPD proponent can successfully respond to these objections.
我们研究了贝纳德特悖论的两个相互竞争的解决方案:因果有限论,根据该理论,任何事物都不可能有无限多的原因,以及不可满足对诊断(UPD),根据该理论,这些悖论在逻辑上是不可能的,不需要采用形而上学的论点来避免它们。我们认为UPD相对于因果有限论具有显著的理论优势。然而,因果有限论者对统一发展民主党提出了两个主要的反对意见。首先,他们敦促UPD需要假设一种“神秘的力量”来防止悖论的产生。由于这样的力量是不可信的,UPD陷入了困境。其次,他们采用重组或拼凑原则来论证,如果因果有限主义是错误的,矛盾的情况是可能的。由于这种情况是不可能的,因果有限主义是正确的,因此需要一个实质性的形而上学命题来避免悖论。我们认为,UPD的支持者可以成功地回应这些反对意见。
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引用次数: 0
Freedom, Omniscience and the Contingent A Priori 自由、全知全能与先验权变
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-21 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae058
Fabio Lampert
One of the major challenges in the philosophy of religion is theological fatalism — roughly, the claim that divine omniscience is incompatible with free will. In this article, I present new reasons to be sceptical of what I consider to be the strongest argument for theological fatalism. First, I argue that divine foreknowledge is not necessary for an argument against free will if we take into account divine knowledge of contingent a priori truths. Second, I show that this argument can be generalized so that ordinary human knowledge of contingent a priori truths also leads to an argument against free will. This, I believe, results in an absurd conclusion that is unacceptable to both theists and non-theists. But if there is something wrong with this argument, there is something wrong, too, with the argument for theological fatalism. Although there is a range of possible responses, I suggest that the core issue in all cases is a closure principle — specifically, the principle that ‘no choice about’ is closed under entailment (or strict implication).
神学宿命论是宗教哲学面临的主要挑战之一--粗略地说,神的全知全能与自由意志不相容。在本文中,我提出了新的理由来怀疑我认为是神学宿命论最有力的论据。首先,我认为,如果我们考虑到神对或然先验真理的知识,那么神的预知就不是反对自由意志的论证所必需的。其次,我证明这一论证可以推广到普通人对或然先验真理的知识也可以导致反对自由意志的论证。我认为,这会导致有神论者和非有神论者都无法接受的荒谬结论。但是,如果这个论证有问题,那么神学宿命论的论证也有问题。虽然有一系列可能的回应,但我认为所有情况下的核心问题都是封闭原则--具体来说,"没有选择 "在蕴含(或严格蕴含)下是封闭的。
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引用次数: 0
Conceptual Decolonization, Conceptual Justice, and Religious Concepts 概念非殖民化、概念正义和宗教概念
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-17 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae053
Mikel Burley
Calls for decolonization are on the rise in social and academic life, but ‘decolonization’ can mean various things. This article expounds and critically evaluates the programme of conceptual decolonization, chiefly as promulgated in relation to African philosophy by Kwasi Wiredu. The programme involves both resisting the unreflective acceptance of non-indigenous concepts and constructively utilizing indigenous conceptual resources to address philosophical questions. Examining recent objections from Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò and giving particular attention to Wiredu’s treatment of religious concepts, I concur with Wiredu that conceptual decolonization can encourage conceptual enlargement but argue that care is needed to avoid oversimplifying the non-indigenous concepts that are subjected to scrutiny.
非殖民化的呼声在社会和学术界日益高涨,但 "非殖民化 "的含义却多种多样。本文阐述并批判性地评价了概念非殖民化方案,主要是夸西-威雷杜在非洲哲学方面提出的方案。该计划既包括抵制不加反思地接受非本土概念,也包括建设性地利用本土概念资源来解决哲学问题。通过研究 Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò 最近提出的反对意见,并特别关注 Wiredu 对宗教概念的处理,我同意 Wiredu 的观点,即概念的非殖民化可以鼓励概念的扩展,但认为需要注意避免过度简化接受审查的非本土概念。
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引用次数: 0
Symmetry, Invariance, and Imprecise Probability 对称性、不变性和不精确概率
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-16 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae048
Zachary Goodsell, Jacob M Nebel
It is tempting to think that a process of choosing a point at random from the surface of a sphere can be probabilistically symmetric, in the sense that any two regions of the sphere which differ by a rotation are equally likely to include the chosen point. Isaacs, Hájek and Hawthorne (2022) argue from such symmetry principles and the mathematical paradoxes of measure to the existence of imprecise chances and the rationality of imprecise credences. Williamson (2007) has argued from a related symmetry principle to the failure of probabilistic regularity. We contend that these arguments fail, because they rely on auxiliary assumptions about probability which are inconsistent with symmetry to begin with. We argue, moreover, that symmetry should be rejected in light of this inconsistency, and because it has implausible decision-theoretic implications. The weaker principle of probabilistic invariance says that the probabilistic comparison of any two regions is unchanged by rotations of the sphere. This principle supports a more compelling argument for imprecise probability. We show, however, that invariance is incompatible with mundane judgements about what is probable. Ultimately, we find reason to be suspicious of the application of principles like symmetry and invariance to non-measurable regions.
我们很容易想到,从球体表面随机选择一个点的过程在概率上是对称的,即球体上任何两个相差一圈的区域都同样有可能包含所选的点。Isaacs、Hájek 和 Hawthorne(2022 年)从这种对称性原理和度量衡的数学悖论出发,论证了不精确机会的存在和不精确信任的合理性。Williamson(2007)从相关的对称性原理论证了概率规律性的失败。我们认为这些论证都失败了,因为它们依赖于关于概率的辅助假设,而这些假设从一开始就与对称性不一致。此外,我们还认为,鉴于这种不一致性,对称性应该被摒弃,因为它具有难以置信的决策理论含义。较弱的概率不变性原则认为,任何两个区域的概率比较都不会因球体的旋转而改变。这一原则为不精确概率提供了更有说服力的论据。然而,我们表明,不变性与关于什么是概率的世俗判断是不相容的。最终,我们发现有理由怀疑对称性和不变性等原理是否适用于不可测量的区域。
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引用次数: 0
KK is Wrong Because We Say So KK 错了,因为我们这么说
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-15 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae050
Simon Goldstein, John Hawthorne
This paper offers a new argument against the KK thesis, which says that if you know p, then you know that you know p. We argue that KK is inconsistent with the fact that anyone denies the KK thesis: imagine that Dudley says he knows p but that he does not have 100 iterations of knowledge about p. If KK were true, Dudley would know that he has 100 iterations of knowledge about p, and so he wouldn’t deny that he did. We consider several epicycles, and also explore whether the argument type also challenges other structural conditions on knowledge, such as closure under deduction.
本文针对KK论题提出了一个新的论证,KK论题说,如果你知道p,那么你就知道你知道p。我们认为KK论题与任何人否认KK论题的事实不一致:设想达德利说他知道p,但他没有关于p的100次知识迭代。如果KK是真的,达德利就会知道他有关于p的100次知识迭代,因此他就不会否认他有。我们考虑了几种外循环,还探讨了该论证类型是否也挑战了知识的其他结构条件,如演绎下的封闭性。
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引用次数: 0
Not Quite Yet a Hazy Limbo of Mystery: Intuition in Russell’s An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry 尚不完全是朦胧的迷雾:罗素《几何基础论》中的直觉
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-08 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae041
Tyke Nunez
I argue that in Bertrand Russell’s An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry (1897), his forms of externality serve the same fundamental role in grounding the possibility of geometry that Immanuel Kant’s forms of intuition serve in grounding geometry in his critical philosophy. Specifically, both provide knowledge of bare numerical difference, where we have no concept of this difference. Because geometry deals with such conceptually homogeneous magnitudes and their composition on both accounts, forms of intuition or externality (respectively) are at its foundation.
我认为,在伯特兰-罗素的《几何学基础论》(1897 年)中,他的外在性形式在几何学可能性的基础上发挥了与伊曼努尔-康德的直观形式在其批判哲学中在几何学基础上发挥的相同的基本作用。具体地说,两者都提供了关于赤裸裸的数字差异的知识,而我们却没有关于这种差异的概念。由于几何学处理的是这种概念上同质的量及其构成,因此直观或外在性(分别)的形式是几何学的基础。
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引用次数: 0
Intentions and Inquiry 意图与探索
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae056
Daniel C Friedman
This paper defends the Intention Account of Individual Inquiry. On this account, inquiry is best understood by appeal to a ‘question-directed intention’ (QDI), an intention to answer a question broadly construed. This account’s core commitments help meet recent challenges plaguing extant approaches to characterizing inquiry. First, QDIs are the type of mental state central to inquiry, not attitudes like curiosity or wonder. Second, holding a QDI towards a question and acting in service of it constitutes the start of inquiry. Third, controversial norms which mandate a rational inquirer’s ignorance towards the answer to her question can be reformulated and defended by appeal to rational constraints on intention. Fourth, instrumental pressures inquirers face are the standard pressures of plan-rationality. In defending these theses, I show that the Intention Account provides compelling explanations to standing challenges, in ways competitors cannot. It does so by advancing understanding of how our epistemic and practical agency are intertwined.
本文为 "个人探究的意图论"(Intention Account of Individual Inquiry)辩护。根据这一观点,对探究的最佳理解是诉诸 "问题导向意图"(QDI),即广义上回答问题的意图。该理论的核心承诺有助于应对近期困扰现有研究方法的挑战。首先,QDI 是探究的核心心理状态类型,而不是好奇心或惊奇等态度。其次,对一个问题持有 QDI 并为之采取行动是探究的开始。第三,有争议的规范规定理性探究者对问题的答案一无所知,这些规范可以通过诉诸对意图的理性约束来重新表述和辩护。第四,探究者面临的工具性压力是计划理性的标准压力。在对这些论点进行辩护时,我表明意图论能够以竞争者所无法比拟的方式为长期挑战提供令人信服的解释。它是通过推进对我们的认识论与实践机构如何相互交织的理解而做到这一点的。
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引用次数: 0
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