Coralio Ballester , Antonio Rodriguez-Moral , Marc Vorsatz
{"title":"Cognitive reflection in experimental anchored guessing games","authors":"Coralio Ballester , Antonio Rodriguez-Moral , Marc Vorsatz","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The cognitive reflection test or CRT (<span><span>Frederick, 2005</span></span>) has been found to be a reliable predictor of the degree of strategic sophistication of subjects in a variety of laboratory experiments. These studies have found that subjects who score higher in the CRT make choices that are closer to Nash equilibrium (i.e., <span><span>Brañas-Garza et al., 2012</span></span>). In an extended level-<em>k</em> model with free subjective beliefs, we theoretically decompose the closeness to equilibrium for the class of anchored guessing games introduced in <span><span>Ballester et al. (2023)</span></span> into two effects: subjects with a smaller distance to equilibrium must possess a higher reasoning level in the level-<em>k</em> hierarchy or their level-<em>k</em> iteration process must begin from a starting point (called “seed”) that is inherently more advantageously positioned, which translates into the concept of “seed distance” (or both). Our main experimental finding is that subjects with a higher CRT score play closer to equilibrium due to the fact that they iterate more often in their reasoning process (as in <span><span>Brañas-Garza et al., 2012</span></span>), yet we find no clear evidence that they have a smaller seed distance. We also find evidence of a learning or adaptation process, which can be characterized by a warm-up phase (in which subjects reduce their seed distance), followed by a learning phase (in which they increase their reasoning level, at a faster rate in subjects with higher CRT) and then a saturation phase in which no further improvements are made.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 179-195"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Games and Economic Behavior","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001362","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The cognitive reflection test or CRT (Frederick, 2005) has been found to be a reliable predictor of the degree of strategic sophistication of subjects in a variety of laboratory experiments. These studies have found that subjects who score higher in the CRT make choices that are closer to Nash equilibrium (i.e., Brañas-Garza et al., 2012). In an extended level-k model with free subjective beliefs, we theoretically decompose the closeness to equilibrium for the class of anchored guessing games introduced in Ballester et al. (2023) into two effects: subjects with a smaller distance to equilibrium must possess a higher reasoning level in the level-k hierarchy or their level-k iteration process must begin from a starting point (called “seed”) that is inherently more advantageously positioned, which translates into the concept of “seed distance” (or both). Our main experimental finding is that subjects with a higher CRT score play closer to equilibrium due to the fact that they iterate more often in their reasoning process (as in Brañas-Garza et al., 2012), yet we find no clear evidence that they have a smaller seed distance. We also find evidence of a learning or adaptation process, which can be characterized by a warm-up phase (in which subjects reduce their seed distance), followed by a learning phase (in which they increase their reasoning level, at a faster rate in subjects with higher CRT) and then a saturation phase in which no further improvements are made.
期刊介绍:
Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology