Cognitive reflection in experimental anchored guessing games

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-09-27 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.003
{"title":"Cognitive reflection in experimental anchored guessing games","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The cognitive reflection test or CRT (<span><span>Frederick, 2005</span></span>) has been found to be a reliable predictor of the degree of strategic sophistication of subjects in a variety of laboratory experiments. These studies have found that subjects who score higher in the CRT make choices that are closer to Nash equilibrium (i.e., <span><span>Brañas-Garza et al., 2012</span></span>). In an extended level-<em>k</em> model with free subjective beliefs, we theoretically decompose the closeness to equilibrium for the class of anchored guessing games introduced in <span><span>Ballester et al. (2023)</span></span> into two effects: subjects with a smaller distance to equilibrium must possess a higher reasoning level in the level-<em>k</em> hierarchy or their level-<em>k</em> iteration process must begin from a starting point (called “seed”) that is inherently more advantageously positioned, which translates into the concept of “seed distance” (or both). Our main experimental finding is that subjects with a higher CRT score play closer to equilibrium due to the fact that they iterate more often in their reasoning process (as in <span><span>Brañas-Garza et al., 2012</span></span>), yet we find no clear evidence that they have a smaller seed distance. We also find evidence of a learning or adaptation process, which can be characterized by a warm-up phase (in which subjects reduce their seed distance), followed by a learning phase (in which they increase their reasoning level, at a faster rate in subjects with higher CRT) and then a saturation phase in which no further improvements are made.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Games and Economic Behavior","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001362","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

The cognitive reflection test or CRT (Frederick, 2005) has been found to be a reliable predictor of the degree of strategic sophistication of subjects in a variety of laboratory experiments. These studies have found that subjects who score higher in the CRT make choices that are closer to Nash equilibrium (i.e., Brañas-Garza et al., 2012). In an extended level-k model with free subjective beliefs, we theoretically decompose the closeness to equilibrium for the class of anchored guessing games introduced in Ballester et al. (2023) into two effects: subjects with a smaller distance to equilibrium must possess a higher reasoning level in the level-k hierarchy or their level-k iteration process must begin from a starting point (called “seed”) that is inherently more advantageously positioned, which translates into the concept of “seed distance” (or both). Our main experimental finding is that subjects with a higher CRT score play closer to equilibrium due to the fact that they iterate more often in their reasoning process (as in Brañas-Garza et al., 2012), yet we find no clear evidence that they have a smaller seed distance. We also find evidence of a learning or adaptation process, which can be characterized by a warm-up phase (in which subjects reduce their seed distance), followed by a learning phase (in which they increase their reasoning level, at a faster rate in subjects with higher CRT) and then a saturation phase in which no further improvements are made.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
实验锚定竞猜游戏中的认知反思
在各种实验室实验中,人们发现认知反思测试(CRT)(弗雷德里克,2005 年)可以可靠地预测受试者的战略复杂程度。这些研究发现,在 CRT 中得分较高的受试者做出的选择更接近纳什均衡(即 Brañas-Garza 等人,2012 年)。在一个具有自由主观信念的扩展水平-k 模型中,我们从理论上将 Ballester 等人(2023 年)中引入的锚定猜测博弈的均衡接近度分解为两种效应:与均衡距离较小的被试必须在水平-k 层次结构中拥有较高的推理水平,或者他们的水平-k 迭代过程必须从一个先天位置更有利的起点(称为 "种子")开始,这就转化为 "种子距离 "的概念(或两者兼而有之)。我们的主要实验发现是,CRT 分数较高的受试者在推理过程中迭代次数较多(如 Brañas-Garza et al.我们还发现了学习或适应过程的证据,这一过程的特点是热身阶段(在这一阶段,受试者会缩小他们的种子距离),随后是学习阶段(在这一阶段,受试者会提高他们的推理水平,CRT 越高的受试者推理水平提高得越快),然后是饱和阶段,在这一阶段,受试者的推理水平不会进一步提高。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
期刊最新文献
Towards data auctions with externalities Time for memorable consumption Equilibria in matching markets with soft and hard liquidity constraints Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests Commitment to the truth creates trust in market exchange: Experimental evidence
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1