The multilevel determinants of overlapping membership on board committees: Evidence from Chinese banks

Abstract

This study manually collects data on 4090 board committee members from 36 listed banks in 11 regions of China from 2007 to 2020, uses a hierarchical linear model, and integrates institutional and resource dependence theories to examine the multilevel determinants of overlapping membership on board committees. The results show that lower legalization and the absence of chief risk officers promote overlapping membership on board committees. Directors who have financial expertise, are shorter-tenured, and do not have social relationships with senior leaders sit on more board committees. Further analysis shows that information and resource needs are more likely to drive overlapping membership on board monitoring committees, and independent directors with lower information acquisition costs sit on more board committees. The moderating analysis between multilevel factors shows that legalization and the presence of chief risk officers substitute for, while religion and board interlocks complement director-level information and resource needs.