How corruption prevails: A laboratory experiment

IF 5.2 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS 中国经济评论 Pub Date : 2024-10-09 DOI:10.1016/j.chieco.2024.102290
Yefeng Chen , Yuli Ding , Lei Mao , Yiwen Pan , Xue Wang
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Abstract

Previous research has found the contagion effect in corruption, nevertheless the mechanisms underlying the contamination of corruption remain unexplored. In this paper, we varied different kinds of information relevant to corruption, which are the number(breadth) /the size(depth) /the maximum amount of corruption, exposed to participants in a laboratory experiment to testify how the salience of different information affects participants' corruption decisions. Our results show that participants are more likely to engage in corruption and provide a higher amount after they are informed of the information of peers' corrupt behaviors. We confirm that decreasing social norms cost related to corrupt behavior, belief of increased likelihood of finding a partner to reach corruption, and conforming to peers' behaviors are the main channels.
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腐败是如何盛行的?实验室实验
以往的研究已经发现了腐败的传染效应,但腐败传染的内在机制仍有待探索。在本文中,我们在实验室实验中向参与者暴露了不同种类的腐败相关信息,即腐败的数量(广度)、规模(深度)和最高金额,以验证不同信息的显著性如何影响参与者的腐败决策。我们的结果表明,参与者在获知同伴腐败行为的信息后,更有可能参与腐败,并提供更高的腐败金额。我们证实,降低与腐败行为相关的社会规范成本、相信找到腐败伙伴的可能性增加以及顺从同伴的行为是主要的渠道。
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来源期刊
中国经济评论
中国经济评论 ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
10.60
自引率
4.40%
发文量
380
期刊介绍: The China Economic Review publishes original works of scholarship which add to the knowledge of the economy of China and to economies as a discipline. We seek, in particular, papers dealing with policy, performance and institutional change. Empirical papers normally use a formal model, a data set, and standard statistical techniques. Submissions are subjected to double-blind peer review.
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