{"title":"Freud, bullshit, and pseudoscience","authors":"Michael T. Michael","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.09.003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper critically examines the validity of Freudian psychoanalysis within the framework of Moberger's characterisation of pseudoscience as bullshit with scientific pretensions. The central question addressed is whether Freudian psychoanalysis qualifies as “bullshit,” following Moberger's guideline of looking for systematic fallacies. The analysis centres on two fundamental critiques against psychoanalysis: one posited by Popper, contending that psychoanalytic interpretation is excessively flexible, and another by Glymour, asserting that Freud's interpretative method baselessly posits associations as causes. This paper argues that both criticisms rest on misunderstandings and asserts that Freudian psychoanalysis does not commit the alleged fallacies. It also offers positive evidence that Freud was not a bullshitter. The conclusion drawn is that psychoanalysis should not be regarded as bullshit, and hence does not qualify as pseudoscience on Moberger's criteria. Consequently, the paper suggests that Freudian psychoanalysis deserves a fairer hearing then many have given it.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"108 ","pages":"Pages 64-72"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0039368124001353","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper critically examines the validity of Freudian psychoanalysis within the framework of Moberger's characterisation of pseudoscience as bullshit with scientific pretensions. The central question addressed is whether Freudian psychoanalysis qualifies as “bullshit,” following Moberger's guideline of looking for systematic fallacies. The analysis centres on two fundamental critiques against psychoanalysis: one posited by Popper, contending that psychoanalytic interpretation is excessively flexible, and another by Glymour, asserting that Freud's interpretative method baselessly posits associations as causes. This paper argues that both criticisms rest on misunderstandings and asserts that Freudian psychoanalysis does not commit the alleged fallacies. It also offers positive evidence that Freud was not a bullshitter. The conclusion drawn is that psychoanalysis should not be regarded as bullshit, and hence does not qualify as pseudoscience on Moberger's criteria. Consequently, the paper suggests that Freudian psychoanalysis deserves a fairer hearing then many have given it.
期刊介绍:
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science is devoted to the integrated study of the history, philosophy and sociology of the sciences. The editors encourage contributions both in the long-established areas of the history of the sciences and the philosophy of the sciences and in the topical areas of historiography of the sciences, the sciences in relation to gender, culture and society and the sciences in relation to arts. The Journal is international in scope and content and publishes papers from a wide range of countries and cultural traditions.