Freedom, Omniscience and the Contingent A Priori

IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY MIND Pub Date : 2024-10-21 DOI:10.1093/mind/fzae058
Fabio Lampert
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Abstract

One of the major challenges in the philosophy of religion is theological fatalism — roughly, the claim that divine omniscience is incompatible with free will. In this article, I present new reasons to be sceptical of what I consider to be the strongest argument for theological fatalism. First, I argue that divine foreknowledge is not necessary for an argument against free will if we take into account divine knowledge of contingent a priori truths. Second, I show that this argument can be generalized so that ordinary human knowledge of contingent a priori truths also leads to an argument against free will. This, I believe, results in an absurd conclusion that is unacceptable to both theists and non-theists. But if there is something wrong with this argument, there is something wrong, too, with the argument for theological fatalism. Although there is a range of possible responses, I suggest that the core issue in all cases is a closure principle — specifically, the principle that ‘no choice about’ is closed under entailment (or strict implication).
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自由、全知全能与先验权变
神学宿命论是宗教哲学面临的主要挑战之一--粗略地说,神的全知全能与自由意志不相容。在本文中,我提出了新的理由来怀疑我认为是神学宿命论最有力的论据。首先,我认为,如果我们考虑到神对或然先验真理的知识,那么神的预知就不是反对自由意志的论证所必需的。其次,我证明这一论证可以推广到普通人对或然先验真理的知识也可以导致反对自由意志的论证。我认为,这会导致有神论者和非有神论者都无法接受的荒谬结论。但是,如果这个论证有问题,那么神学宿命论的论证也有问题。虽然有一系列可能的回应,但我认为所有情况下的核心问题都是封闭原则--具体来说,"没有选择 "在蕴含(或严格蕴含)下是封闭的。
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来源期刊
MIND
MIND PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
3.10
自引率
5.60%
发文量
47
期刊介绍: Mind has long been a leading journal in philosophy. For well over 100 years it has presented the best of cutting edge thought from epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. Mind continues its tradition of excellence today. Mind has always enjoyed a strong reputation for the high standards established by its editors and receives around 350 submissions each year. The editor seeks advice from a large number of expert referees, including members of the network of Associate Editors and his international advisers. Mind is published quarterly.
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