Stability vs. no justified envy

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-10-18 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.002
Assaf Romm , Alvin E. Roth , Ran I. Shorrer
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Abstract

Stability and “no justified envy” are used almost synonymously in the matching theory literature. However, they are conceptually different and have logically separate properties. We generalize the definition of justified envy to environments with arbitrary school preferences, feasibility constraints, and contracts, and show that stable allocations may admit justified envy. When choice functions are substitutable, the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm is both stable and admits no justified envy.
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稳定与没有正当理由的嫉妒
在匹配理论文献中,稳定性和 "没有合理的嫉妒 "几乎是同义词。然而,它们在概念上是不同的,在逻辑上也有各自的属性。我们将有理由嫉妒的定义推广到具有任意学校偏好、可行性约束和合约的环境中,并证明稳定的分配可能承认有理由嫉妒。当选择函数可替代时,延迟接受算法的结果既稳定又不允许合理嫉妒。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
期刊最新文献
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