Poor health: Credit and blame attribution in India’s multi-level democracy

IF 5.4 1区 经济学 Q1 DEVELOPMENT STUDIES World Development Pub Date : 2024-10-19 DOI:10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106807
Oliver Heath , Louise Tillin , Jyoti Mishra , Sanjay Kumar , Sandhya Venkateswaran
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Abstract

Lines of accountability for the provision of health services in many federal systems are complex. Institutional structures and political strategies that blur lines of responsibility make it more difficult for voters to claim their rights, to assign responsibility and reward or sanction governments on the basis of their performance. Based on a survey of 1500 voters across five states in India, this paper examines how voters attribute credit and blame for health system performance. In India, central, state and local governments are involved in the delivery and financing of different elements of health care provision from running hospitals, providing health insurance to running vaccination programmes. Contrary to expectations, we find that most voters can broadly attribute responsibility to the relevant level of government for different health services and programmes, however a significant minority consistently misattribute responsibility by holding the local government responsible. We find that perceptions of health system performance matter more than partisanship in explaining when voters hold different levels of government responsible. Those who are less satisfied with the health system are more likely to blame the local government for poor performance, even where it is not constitutionally responsible. This suggests that state and national governments receive credit from voters who perceive services as functioning well but are not punished by those who are dissatisfied. In other words, political leaders are able to capture credit among voters who are more satisfied with health provision while deflecting blame from those who are less satisfied. These findings demonstrate important weaknesses in the chain of electoral accountability for health. The paper suggests possible parallels to authoritarian contexts such as China where recent research has shown that strong centralised political leadership claims credit for public goods provision while deflecting blame for corruption and inefficiency to lower levels of government.
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健康状况不佳:印度多层次民主中的功过归属
在许多联邦系统中,提供医疗服务的责任界限是复杂的。模糊责任界限的制度结构和政治策略使得选民更难主张自己的权利、分配责任并根据政府的表现对其进行奖励或制裁。本文基于对印度五个邦 1500 名选民的调查,探讨了选民如何对卫生系统的绩效进行归功和归责。在印度,中央、邦和地方政府都参与了医疗保健服务的提供和融资,包括开办医院、提供医疗保险和实施疫苗接种计划等。与预期相反,我们发现大多数选民都能大致将不同医疗服务和项目的责任归咎于相关级别的政府,但也有相当一部分选民始终错误地将责任归咎于地方政府。我们发现,在解释选民何时要求各级政府承担责任时,对医疗系统绩效的看法比党派倾向更为重要。那些对医疗系统不太满意的选民更倾向于将表现不佳的责任归咎于地方政府,即使地方政府并不承担宪法规定的责任。这表明,州政府和国家政府从那些认为服务运行良好的选民那里获得了赞誉,但却没有受到那些不满意选民的惩罚。换句话说,政治领导人能够从对医疗服务比较满意的选民那里获得赞誉,同时转移对不太满意的选民的指责。这些研究结果表明了选举卫生问责制链条中的重要缺陷。本文认为这可能与中国等专制国家的情况相似,中国最近的研究表明,强大的中央集权政治领导层为公共产品的提供邀功,同时将腐败和低效的责任推卸给下级政府。
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来源期刊
World Development
World Development Multiple-
CiteScore
12.70
自引率
5.80%
发文量
320
期刊介绍: World Development is a multi-disciplinary monthly journal of development studies. It seeks to explore ways of improving standards of living, and the human condition generally, by examining potential solutions to problems such as: poverty, unemployment, malnutrition, disease, lack of shelter, environmental degradation, inadequate scientific and technological resources, trade and payments imbalances, international debt, gender and ethnic discrimination, militarism and civil conflict, and lack of popular participation in economic and political life. Contributions offer constructive ideas and analysis, and highlight the lessons to be learned from the experiences of different nations, societies, and economies.
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