Ren-Jie Zhang , Hsing-Wei Tai , Zheng-Xu Cao , Kuo-Tai Cheng , Chia-Chen Wei
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
In the context of global carbon emission reduction trends, the mechanism of value co-creation plays an instrumental role in the construction of innovative ecosystems based on low-carbon technologies. This study introduces a triple helix analytical framework for value co-creation in innovative ecosystems and constructs a three-party differential game model that incorporates innovators, service providers, and regulators. The model examines the conditions of strategic stability and sensitivity among different game players and makes the following conclusions: (1) Innovators' strategies are linearly influenced by the combined strategies of service providers and regulators, while the effect of innovators and regulators on service providers is non-linear. (2) During the initial stages of the innovation ecosystem, the regulator plays the roles of architect and controller. The NES strategy, aimed at reducing intervention, is triggered when the LCI and GRS strategies exceed certain thresholds. (3) Fiscal subsidies accelerate the convergence of the evolution curves of innovators' and service providers' strategies but also increase the cost burden for regulators, leading them toward passive management measures. (4) Upper-level accountability promotes the evolution of the three-party differential game system from “chaos” to “order,” with the intermediary effect becoming the main route influencing innovation strategy choices. Lastly, the findings suggest that policy measures, such as empowering low-carbon technology innovation with digital technologies, enhancing green service capabilities, and improving green technology assessment systems, may provide empirical evidence for decision-making by management departments.
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