Endogenous decisions on acceptable worker-job mismatch level and the impact on workers’ performance

Abstract

This study examines the endogeneity of a worker’s acceptable level of job mismatch and its impact on worker performance. First, we construct a theoretical model that depicts the tendency of a potential worker to take a job offer if the firm is “attractive” for some reason, even when he or she knows that their personality does not align with the firm’s characteristics. According to this model, a strong tendency for this behavior yields a positive relationship between a worker’s acceptable mismatch level and the firm’s attractive characteristics. Given the positive relationship, an instrumental variable estimation confirms that higher mismatch significantly lowers worker performance. Since “attractive” firms tend to be generally large firms with a major influence on the economy, the lowered performance due to these mismatches can hinder economic strength and hamper national growth. Resolving this issue may avoid further losses.