How does divergence of control and cash-flow rights influence cost stickiness?

Abstract

This study investigates whether the degree of cost stickiness depends on the divergence between control and cash-flow rights of ultimate owners using data from 22 countries. Firms with a large divergence between control and cash-flow rights are known to take more opportunistic actions at the expense of minority shareholders. The empirical results show that the magnitude of cost stickiness decreases as the divergence between control and cash-flow rights increases due to the greater incentives to manipulate earnings. Firms use both accruals earnings management (AEM) and real-activities earnings management (REM), and among REM, they adjust production activity and discretionary expense to affect cost. Additional tests show that the negative relationship between the divergence between control and cash-flow rights and cost stickiness is more pronounced in countries with weak economic, legal, and social factors. This paper, by examining the effect of ownership structure on cost behavior as well as its underlying mechanism, broadens the understanding of sticky cost behavior and contributes to the growing body of literature on the convergence of financial and managerial accounting.