Is Sharing Neighbor Generator in Federated Graph Learning Safe?

Abstract

Nowadays, as privacy concerns continue to rise, federated graph learning (FGL) which generalizes the classic federated learning to graph data has attracted increasing attention. However, while the focus has been on designing collaborative learning algorithms, the potential risks of privacy leakage through the sharing of necessary graph-related information in FGL, such as node embeddings and neighbor generators, have been largely neglected. In this paper, we verify the potential risks of privacy leakage in FGL, and provide insights about the cautions in FGL algorithm design. Specifically, we propose a novel privacy attack algorithm named Privacy Attack on federated Graph learning (PAG) towards reconstructing participants’ private node attributes and the linkage relationships. The participant performing the PAG attack is able to reconstruct the node attributes of the victim by matching the received gradients of the generator, and then train a link prediction model based on its local sub-graph to inductively infer the linkages connected to these reconstructed nodes. We theoretically and empirically demonstrate that under PAG attack, directly sharing the neighbor generators makes the FGL vulnerable to the data reconstruction attack. Furthermore, an investigation into the key factors that can hinder the success of the PAG attack provides insights into corresponding defense strategies and inspires future research into privacy-preserving FGL.