{"title":"Local favoritism in China's public procurement: Information frictions or incentive distortion?","authors":"Wei TANG , Yuan WANG , Jiameng WU","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103716","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper aims to disentangle the roles of information frictions and career incentives of local officials in the allocation of government contracts. Drawing on a unique dataset including both winning and losing bidders of public procurement auctions in China, we document a strong local bias in the contract allocation. These patterns are hardly reconciled with explanations rooted in information frictions or corruption. Instead, we highlight the role of local leaders’ career incentives, presenting evidence that local favoritism is more pronounced in localities with more incentivized mayors. Our findings prompt a reconsideration of the effectiveness of bureaucratic discretion in allocating public resources. (JEL H57, H77, H72, D73, R51)</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"145 ","pages":"Article 103716"},"PeriodicalIF":5.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Urban Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S009411902400086X","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
This paper aims to disentangle the roles of information frictions and career incentives of local officials in the allocation of government contracts. Drawing on a unique dataset including both winning and losing bidders of public procurement auctions in China, we document a strong local bias in the contract allocation. These patterns are hardly reconciled with explanations rooted in information frictions or corruption. Instead, we highlight the role of local leaders’ career incentives, presenting evidence that local favoritism is more pronounced in localities with more incentivized mayors. Our findings prompt a reconsideration of the effectiveness of bureaucratic discretion in allocating public resources. (JEL H57, H77, H72, D73, R51)
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The Journal of Urban Economics provides a focal point for the publication of research papers in the rapidly expanding field of urban economics. It publishes papers of great scholarly merit on a wide range of topics and employing a wide range of approaches to urban economics. The Journal welcomes papers that are theoretical or empirical, positive or normative. Although the Journal is not intended to be multidisciplinary, papers by noneconomists are welcome if they are of interest to economists. Brief Notes are also published if they lie within the purview of the Journal and if they contain new information, comment on published work, or new theoretical suggestions.
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