Complete conditional type structures

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.006
Nicodemo De Vito
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Abstract

Hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 1999) play a central role for the epistemic analysis of solution concepts in sequential games. They are modelled by type structures, which allow the analyst to represent the players' hierarchies without specifying an infinite sequence of conditional beliefs. Here, we study type structures that satisfy a “richness” property, called completeness. Friedenberg (2010) shows that, under specific conditions, a complete type structure with ordinary beliefs represents all hierarchies. This paper shows that Friedenberg's result can be extended to type structures with conditional beliefs. As an ancillary result of independent interest, we provide a construction of the “canonical” space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs which generalizes the one in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999).
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完整的条件类型结构
条件信念的层次结构(Battigalli 和 Siniscalchi,1999 年)在对顺序博弈中的解法概念进行认识论分析时起着核心作用。它们由类型结构建模,允许分析师在不指定条件信念无限序列的情况下表示博弈者的层次结构。在这里,我们研究的是满足 "丰富性 "属性(即完备性)的类型结构。弗里登伯格(Friedenberg,2010 年)指出,在特定条件下,具有普通信念的完整类型结构代表了所有层次结构。本文表明,弗里登伯格的结果可以扩展到具有条件信念的类型结构。作为一个具有独立意义的附属结果,我们提供了一个条件信念层次结构的 "典型 "空间构造,它概括了 Battigalli 和 Siniscalchi (1999) 的构造。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
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