Relative source credibility affects the continued influence effect: Evidence of rationality in the CIE.

IF 2.8 1区 心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL Cognition Pub Date : 2024-11-18 DOI:10.1016/j.cognition.2024.106000
Carolin V Hey, Marie Luisa Schaper, Ute J Bayen
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Abstract

The Continued Influence Effect (CIE) is the phenomenon that retracted information often continues to influence judgments and inferences. The CIE is rational when the source that retracts the information (the retractor) is less credible than the source that originally presented the information (the informant; Connor Desai et al., 2020). Conversely, a CIE is not rational when the retractor is at least as credible as the informant. Thus, a rational account predicts that the CIE depends on the relative credibility of informant and retractor. In two experiments (N = 151, N = 146), informant credibility and retractor credibility were independently manipulated. Participants read a fictitious news report in which original information and a retraction were each presented by either a source with high credibility or a source with low credibility. In both experiments, when the informant was more credible than the retractor, participants showed a CIE compared to control participants who saw neither the information nor the retraction (ds > 0.82). When the informant was less credible than the retractor, participants showed no CIE, in line with a rational account. However, in Experiment 2, participants also showed a CIE when informant and retractor were equally credible (ds > 0.51). This cannot be explained by a rational account, but is consistent with error-based accounts of the CIE. Thus, a rational account alone cannot fully account for the complete pattern of results, but needs to be complemented with accounts that view the CIE as a memory-based error.

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相对来源可信度影响持续影响效应:CIE 中的理性证据。
持续影响效应(CIE)是指被撤回的信息往往会继续影响人们的判断和推论。当撤回信息的来源(撤回者)的可信度低于最初提供信息的来源(提供者;Connor Desai et al.)反之,如果撤回信息者的可信度至少与提供信息者相当,那么 CIE 就不是理性的。因此,从理性的角度来看,CIE 取决于信息提供者和信息收回者的相对可信度。在两个实验中(N = 151,N = 146),告知者可信度和转述者可信度被独立操纵。参与者阅读了一篇虚构的新闻报道,在这篇报道中,原始信息和撤回信息分别由可信度高或可信度低的信息来源提供。在这两项实验中,当提供信息者比撤回信息者更可信时,与既没有看到信息也没有看到撤回信息的对照组参与者相比,参与者都表现出了 CIE(ds > 0.82)。当信息提供者的可信度低于撤回者时,参与者没有表现出 CIE,这与理性解释相符。然而,在实验 2 中,当提供信息者和撤回信息者的可信度相同时,参与者也表现出了 CIE(ds > 0.51)。这不能用理性解释来解释,而是与基于错误的 CIE 解释相一致。因此,仅凭理性解释并不能完全解释完整的结果模式,还需要将 CIE 视为基于记忆的错误的解释来补充。
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来源期刊
Cognition
Cognition PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL-
CiteScore
6.40
自引率
5.90%
发文量
283
期刊介绍: Cognition is an international journal that publishes theoretical and experimental papers on the study of the mind. It covers a wide variety of subjects concerning all the different aspects of cognition, ranging from biological and experimental studies to formal analysis. Contributions from the fields of psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, computer science, mathematics, ethology and philosophy are welcome in this journal provided that they have some bearing on the functioning of the mind. In addition, the journal serves as a forum for discussion of social and political aspects of cognitive science.
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