Liping Yang, Mengmeng Zhang, Lidong Zhang, Qinghai Lin
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
Although Type A personality traits have been confirmed to be more frequently engaged in risky driving behaviours, the existing research on the decision-making of queue-jumping behaviours has not considered this personality trait. This study aimed to explore the decision-making processes of the subject driver’s queue-jumping and the follower vehicle driver’s yielding behaviours with Type A and Type B personalities. First, the decision-making utility variables for both players were selected, and a payoff matrix considering utility variable weights was constructed. Next, a decision-making utility evaluation questionnaire was designed, and this questionnaire and the existing Type A behaviour pattern scale were investigated simultaneously. Then, the weight coefficients of the decision-making utility variables were calculated; the replicated dynamic equations of four game combinations were constructed and the local stability principle of a dynamic system was used to determine the evolutionarily stable strategy for each game combination. Finally, the evolutionary process in which subject vehicle drivers select jumping the queue strategy and follower vehicle drivers select giving way strategy was simulated using MATLAB software based on empirical data to verify the validity of the constructed evolutionary game model. The results indicated some differences in the weight coefficients of decision utility variables between Type A and Type B personalities. The constructed game model can effectively reflect the decision-making processes of subject and follower vehicle drivers of different personality types. The dynamic evolution processes of strategy selection were different for the four game combinations. This study revealed the evolutionary game process between subject and follower vehicle drivers, laying a theoretical foundation for traffic management departments to manage queue-jumping behaviours.
虽然 A 型人格特质已被证实更经常参与危险驾驶行为,但现有关于插队行为决策的研究并未考虑这一人格特质。本研究旨在探讨 A 型和 B 型人格的主体驾驶员插队行为和从车驾驶员让行行为的决策过程。首先,选择了双方的决策效用变量,并构建了考虑效用变量权重的报酬矩阵。接着,设计了一份决策效用评价问卷,并同时对该问卷和现有的 A 型行为模式量表进行了研究。然后,计算了决策效用变量的权重系数,构建了四个博弈组合的复制动态方程,并利用动态系统的局部稳定原理确定了每个博弈组合的进化稳定策略。最后,基于经验数据,利用 MATLAB 软件模拟了主体车辆驾驶员选择插队策略和从属车辆驾驶员选择让路策略的进化过程,以验证所构建的进化博弈模型的有效性。结果表明,A 型和 B 型人格的决策效用变量权重系数存在一定差异。所构建的博弈模型能有效反映不同性格类型的主从车辆驾驶员的决策过程。四种博弈组合的策略选择动态演化过程各不相同。本研究揭示了主从车辆驾驶员之间的博弈演化过程,为交通管理部门管理插队行为奠定了理论基础。
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Advanced Transportation (JAT) is a fully peer reviewed international journal in transportation research areas related to public transit, road traffic, transport networks and air transport.
It publishes theoretical and innovative papers on analysis, design, operations, optimization and planning of multi-modal transport networks, transit & traffic systems, transport technology and traffic safety. Urban rail and bus systems, Pedestrian studies, traffic flow theory and control, Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) and automated and/or connected vehicles are some topics of interest.
Highway engineering, railway engineering and logistics do not fall within the aims and scope of JAT.