Impacts of overlapping regulation on the electricity market concerning renewable portfolio standards and carbon emission trading

IF 9 1区 工程技术 Q1 ENERGY & FUELS Renewable Energy Pub Date : 2024-11-19 DOI:10.1016/j.renene.2024.121951
Fanshuai Hu , Dequn Zhou , Yinghao Pan , Jinghe Sun , Qingyuan Zhu
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Abstract

The renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and carbon emission trading (CET) are considered effective emission reduction policy tools. However, the policy impact will become complex when there is overlapping regulation and an increase in trading entities. To analyze the policy effectiveness, this paper constructs a game model combined with goal programming to simulate the electricity market trading which consists of electricity generators and retailers. Green certificate trading and carbon trading are considered. Our research findings highlight the following key points: (1) As quota obligation increases, the strategy of large capacity generator is to increase wholesale price, while the strategy of small capacity generator is to lower wholesale price and increase electricity production. (2) Interestingly, the profit of generators first increases and then decrease with the quota obligation under independent mechanism. Retailers also maximize their profit when the quota obligation is intermediate. (3) The effectiveness of policies in reducing emissions and promoting the development of renewable energy may be ineffective. The quota obligation may reduce green electricity production, and carbon quotas may also increase thermal power production. The policy effects on different entities with different production technologies also varies significantly.
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关于可再生能源组合标准和碳排放交易的重叠监管对电力市场的影响
可再生能源组合标准(RPS)和碳排放交易(CET)被认为是有效的减排政策工具。然而,当监管重叠和交易主体增加时,政策影响将变得复杂。为了分析政策的有效性,本文构建了一个博弈模型,结合目标编程模拟由发电商和零售商组成的电力市场交易。本文考虑了绿色证书交易和碳交易。我们的研究结果突出了以下要点:(1)随着配额义务的增加,大容量发电商的策略是提高批发价格,而小容量发电商的策略是降低批发价格并增加发电量。(2) 有趣的是,在独立机制下,随着配额义务的增加,发电商的利润先增加后减少。当配额义务处于中间状态时,零售商也会实现利润最大化。(3) 减排和促进可再生能源发展的政策效果可能不佳。配额义务可能减少绿色电力生产,碳配额也可能增加火电生产。政策对不同主体、不同生产技术的影响也大不相同。
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来源期刊
Renewable Energy
Renewable Energy 工程技术-能源与燃料
CiteScore
18.40
自引率
9.20%
发文量
1955
审稿时长
6.6 months
期刊介绍: Renewable Energy journal is dedicated to advancing knowledge and disseminating insights on various topics and technologies within renewable energy systems and components. Our mission is to support researchers, engineers, economists, manufacturers, NGOs, associations, and societies in staying updated on new developments in their respective fields and applying alternative energy solutions to current practices. As an international, multidisciplinary journal in renewable energy engineering and research, we strive to be a premier peer-reviewed platform and a trusted source of original research and reviews in the field of renewable energy. Join us in our endeavor to drive innovation and progress in sustainable energy solutions.
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