Mechanism and simulation of intensive use of urban inefficient land based on evolutionary game theory

Abstract

Intensive utilization of urban inefficient land is crucial for achieving sustainable urban development. This study constructs an evolutionary game model of urban inefficient land redevelopment involving three main actors: the government, developers, and the public. The model reveals the staged characteristics of the redevelopment process and the dynamic evolution of decision-making behaviors among the actors. The study finds that the redevelopment process can be divided into three stages: initial, development, and mature, with significant differences in the decision-making behaviors of developers, the government, and the public at each stage. Developers' decisions are influenced by redevelopment benefits and costs, the government's decisions are affected by regulatory benefits, and the public's decisions are impacted by participation benefits and costs. The initial strategy configuration has a significant influence on the system's evolutionary trend. Economic incentives, cost constraints, and public participation are the three pillars driving redevelopment. The study recommends adopting differentiated and dynamic policy combinations, improving the redevelopment benefit distribution mechanism, and strengthening public participation capacity building to promote positive interactions among the actors and achieve efficient land resource utilization. This research systematically analyzes the mechanism of inefficient land redevelopment from a dynamic game perspective, providing a scientific basis for policy formulation and holding great significance for promoting sustainable urban development.