It hurts to ask

IF 2.8 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS European Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104911
Roland Bénabou , Ania Jaroszewicz , George Loewenstein
{"title":"It hurts to ask","authors":"Roland Bénabou ,&nbsp;Ania Jaroszewicz ,&nbsp;George Loewenstein","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104911","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential helper. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be an excuse, a refusal reveals that the person in need, or the relationship, is not valued very much. We show that people may fail to ask even when most helpers would help if told about the need, and that even though a greater need makes help both more valuable and more likely to be granted, it can reduce the propensity to ask. When potential helpers concerned about the recipient’s ask-shyness can make spontaneous offers, this can be a double-edged sword: offering reveals a more caring type and helps solve the failure-to-ask problem, but not offering reveals a not-so-caring one, and this itself deters asking. This discouragement effect can also generate a trap where those in need hope for an offer while willing helpers hope for an ask, resulting in significant inefficiencies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"171 ","pages":"Article 104911"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Economic Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S001429212400240X","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential helper. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be an excuse, a refusal reveals that the person in need, or the relationship, is not valued very much. We show that people may fail to ask even when most helpers would help if told about the need, and that even though a greater need makes help both more valuable and more likely to be granted, it can reduce the propensity to ask. When potential helpers concerned about the recipient’s ask-shyness can make spontaneous offers, this can be a double-edged sword: offering reveals a more caring type and helps solve the failure-to-ask problem, but not offering reveals a not-so-caring one, and this itself deters asking. This discouragement effect can also generate a trap where those in need hope for an offer while willing helpers hope for an ask, resulting in significant inefficiencies.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
问是伤人的
我们将提供、请求和给予帮助或其他利益作为需要帮助的人与潜在帮助者之间的双边私人信息的三阶段博弈来分析。请求需要冒着被拒绝的风险,这可能是痛苦的:因为意识不到需要不再是借口,拒绝表明有需要的人或关系不是很受重视。我们的研究表明,即使大多数帮助者在被告知需要帮助时都会提供帮助,人们也可能不会提出请求。而且,尽管更大的需求使帮助更有价值,更有可能被给予,但它可以减少人们提出请求的倾向。当潜在的帮助者担心受助者会害羞而自发地提出帮助时,这可能是一把双刃剑:提供帮助表明你是一个更关心别人的人,有助于解决不主动提出问题,但不提供帮助则表明你不关心别人,这本身就会阻碍你提出问题。这种令人沮丧的效果也会产生一个陷阱,那些需要帮助的人希望得到一个提议,而愿意帮助的人则希望得到一个要求,从而导致效率低下。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
4.70
自引率
3.60%
发文量
170
期刊介绍: The European Economic Review (EER) started publishing in 1969 as the first research journal specifically aiming to contribute to the development and application of economics as a science in Europe. As a broad-based professional and international journal, the EER welcomes submissions of applied and theoretical research papers in all fields of economics. The aim of the EER is to contribute to the development of the science of economics and its applications, as well as to improve communication between academic researchers, teachers and policy makers across the European continent and beyond.
期刊最新文献
It hurts to ask Economic expectations under the shadow of party polarization: Evidence from 135 government changes Firms and economic performance: A view from trade Portfolio flows and household portfolios Labor reallocation effects of furlough schemes: Evidence from two recessions in Spain
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1