{"title":"Multitasking and leadership in optimal incentive contracts","authors":"Kohei Daido , Takeshi Murooka","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106824","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study multitasking problems where an agent engages in both a contractible and a non-contractible task, which are substitutes. The agent has private information on the value of the non-contractible task, and there are followers (e.g., another agent, a third party, or a principal) who also contribute to this task. The agent’s effort can serve as a signal of the value as in the literature on leading-by-example (Hermalin, 1998). We derive the condition in which the principal provides high-powered incentives for the contractible task to mitigate the agent’s excessive signaling.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106824"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3000,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268124004384","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2024/11/28 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We study multitasking problems where an agent engages in both a contractible and a non-contractible task, which are substitutes. The agent has private information on the value of the non-contractible task, and there are followers (e.g., another agent, a third party, or a principal) who also contribute to this task. The agent’s effort can serve as a signal of the value as in the literature on leading-by-example (Hermalin, 1998). We derive the condition in which the principal provides high-powered incentives for the contractible task to mitigate the agent’s excessive signaling.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.
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