Pub Date : 2026-01-15DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107415
Marina Díez-Rituerto , Javier Gardeazabal , Nagore Iriberri , Pedro Rey-Biel
Multiple choice question tests are often the gateway to important professional outcomes. We study gender differences in willingness to guess among highly skilled and trained candidates in a high stakes multiple choice question test, before and after a reduction in the number of alternative answers to each question, lowering the penalty for incorrect answers to the critical value, i.e, the one yielding zero expected value upon uniform beliefs. We find heterogeneous gender differences, replicate the previous finding that women answer fewer questions than men, and conclude that reducing the number of alternative answers levels the field for men and women among those candidates who answer most of the questions.
{"title":"Gender differences in willingness to guess revisited: Heterogeneity in a high stakes professional setting","authors":"Marina Díez-Rituerto , Javier Gardeazabal , Nagore Iriberri , Pedro Rey-Biel","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107415","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107415","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Multiple choice question tests are often the gateway to important professional outcomes. We study gender differences in willingness to guess among highly skilled and trained candidates in a high stakes multiple choice question test, before and after a reduction in the number of alternative answers to each question, lowering the penalty for incorrect answers to the critical value, i.e, the one yielding zero expected value upon uniform beliefs. We find heterogeneous gender differences, replicate the previous finding that women answer fewer questions than men, and conclude that reducing the number of alternative answers levels the field for men and women among those candidates who answer most of the questions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107415"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-15DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107410
Vasudha Jain , Mark Whitmeyer
We study competitive disclosure of information on idiosyncratic product quality by two firms to a rationally inattentive consumer. Unless attention costs are low, there is an equilibrium in which the firms provide the consumer with as much information as she would process if she controlled information provision. This is not true if there is only one firm. Our main welfare result reveals a surprising implication: when attention costs are moderate, the probability that consumers select the higher-quality product can be strictly greater under costly attention than under costless attention. This finding has important implications for policy debates about information disclosure requirements and consumer protection in markets with cognitively constrained agents.
{"title":"Competitive disclosure of information to a rationally inattentive agent","authors":"Vasudha Jain , Mark Whitmeyer","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107410","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107410","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study competitive disclosure of information on idiosyncratic product quality by two firms to a rationally inattentive consumer. Unless attention costs are low, there is an equilibrium in which the firms provide the consumer with as much information as she would process if she controlled information provision. This is not true if there is only one firm. Our main welfare result reveals a surprising implication: when attention costs are moderate, the probability that consumers select the higher-quality product can be strictly greater under costly attention than under costless attention. This finding has important implications for policy debates about information disclosure requirements and consumer protection in markets with cognitively constrained agents.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107410"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-15DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107414
Feng Zhu , Wenbo Zou
Generative artificial intelligence (AI) technologies are widely regarded as having the potential to enhance human creativity. In a pre-registered lab experiment, we assigned 302 university students tasks involving the creation of ideas for generating creative pictures, with a randomly selected subset granted access to ChatGPT. The results indicate that access to ChatGPT improves participants’ creative performance. The treatment effect follows an inverted-U relationship with respect to participants’ baseline creative potential, leading to a reduction in the inequality of their creative performances. Comparing the creative performance of human-AI teams to ChatGPT standalone, we find no evidence of complementarity. However, by using measures construed from the human-AI conversations to explain the variations in the observed treatment effects, we find suggestive evidence that collaborative involvement of ChatGPT is associated with more positive effects. Finally, we also observe significant treatment effects on participants’ opinions about AI, their ratings of subjective experiences during the tasks, and their self-reported creative and problem-solving abilities.
{"title":"Generative AI adoption in human creative tasks: Experimental evidence","authors":"Feng Zhu , Wenbo Zou","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107414","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107414","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Generative artificial intelligence (AI) technologies are widely regarded as having the potential to enhance human creativity. In a pre-registered lab experiment, we assigned 302 university students tasks involving the creation of ideas for generating creative pictures, with a randomly selected subset granted access to ChatGPT. The results indicate that access to ChatGPT improves participants’ creative performance. The treatment effect follows an inverted-U relationship with respect to participants’ baseline creative potential, leading to a reduction in the inequality of their creative performances. Comparing the creative performance of human-AI teams to ChatGPT standalone, we find no evidence of complementarity. However, by using measures construed from the human-AI conversations to explain the variations in the observed treatment effects, we find suggestive evidence that collaborative involvement of ChatGPT is associated with more positive effects. Finally, we also observe significant treatment effects on participants’ opinions about AI, their ratings of subjective experiences during the tasks, and their self-reported creative and problem-solving abilities.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107414"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-15DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107411
Yeow Hwee Chua , Zu Yao Hong
This paper examines how beliefs of tail risk events influence macroeconomic expectations in a Bayesian learning model with noisy signals. Relative to a Gaussian model, we show theoretically and quantitatively that the misperception of tail risk results in overreaction to first and second-moment shocks. First-moment shocks generate excessive optimism and pessimism in individuals as they provide valuable information about tail risk. Second-moment shocks, which are countercyclical, give rise to more pessimistic forecasts during downturns as higher uncertainty is linked to an increased likelihood of recessions. Our findings shed light on factors driving overreaction in expectations and highlight the importance of uncertainty shocks in propagating macroeconomic stability.
{"title":"Tail risk and expectations","authors":"Yeow Hwee Chua , Zu Yao Hong","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107411","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107411","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines how beliefs of tail risk events influence macroeconomic expectations in a Bayesian learning model with noisy signals. Relative to a Gaussian model, we show theoretically and quantitatively that the misperception of tail risk results in overreaction to first and second-moment shocks. First-moment shocks generate excessive optimism and pessimism in individuals as they provide valuable information about tail risk. Second-moment shocks, which are countercyclical, give rise to more pessimistic forecasts during downturns as higher uncertainty is linked to an increased likelihood of recessions. Our findings shed light on factors driving overreaction in expectations and highlight the importance of uncertainty shocks in propagating macroeconomic stability.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107411"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-14DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107412
Raicho Bojilov , Francisco Brahm , Joaquin Poblete
Quantitative evidence from the field on the output loss due to incentive ratcheting is mixed. One possible explanation is that the output response to ratcheting varies with the level of ratcheting. This paper estimates how the output cost of ratcheting varies with the level of ratcheting using rich data from the restructuring of the salesforce of a large Chilean producer and distributor of beverages. We show that in response to reducing ratcheting by one standard deviation, the salespersons at this firm increase sales by an average of 19%. The output response is non-linear in ratcheting: Output reduction is greatest when workers move from low or no ratcheting to some ratcheting. We execute additional analysis to verify the causal nature of our result.
{"title":"Measuring the output reduction due to incentive ratcheting in the field","authors":"Raicho Bojilov , Francisco Brahm , Joaquin Poblete","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107412","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107412","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Quantitative evidence from the field on the output loss due to incentive ratcheting is mixed. One possible explanation is that the output response to ratcheting varies with the level of ratcheting. This paper estimates how the output cost of ratcheting varies with the level of ratcheting using rich data from the restructuring of the salesforce of a large Chilean producer and distributor of beverages. We show that in response to reducing ratcheting by one standard deviation, the salespersons at this firm increase sales by an average of 19%. The output response is non-linear in ratcheting: Output reduction is greatest when workers move from low or no ratcheting to some ratcheting. We execute additional analysis to verify the causal nature of our result.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107412"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How does exposure to Islamist terrorism change perceptions about Muslims and immigrants? We conducted a large-scale survey that measures misperceptions towards minority groups in four European countries. Our results show that terror attacks in the past increased misperceptions of the share of Muslims and immigrants. We also contend that this increase in misperceptions is particularly large and significant for lower-educated respondents and people from regions with a low share of the foreign population. Given that misperceptions are higher on average in regions with a large share of foreigners, terror attacks make misperceptions across different regions converge.
{"title":"Terrorism and misperceptions: Evidence from Europe","authors":"K. Peren Arin , Umair Khalil , Deni Mazrekaj , Marcel Thum","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107408","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107408","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>How does exposure to Islamist terrorism change perceptions about Muslims and immigrants? We conducted a large-scale survey that measures misperceptions towards minority groups in four European countries. Our results show that terror attacks in the past increased misperceptions of the share of Muslims and immigrants. We also contend that this increase in misperceptions is particularly large and significant for lower-educated respondents and people from regions with a low share of the foreign population. Given that misperceptions are higher on average in regions with a large share of foreigners, terror attacks make misperceptions across different regions converge.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107408"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-12DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107420
Federico Vaccari
This paper studies the organization of communication between biased senders and a receiver in binary decision-making problems. Senders can misreport their private information at a cost. Efficiency is achieved by resolving information asymmetries without incurring these costs—i.e., by attaining the complete-information outcome. Only one communication protocol is efficient, robust to collusion, and free from unnecessary complexities. This protocol has a simple, adversarial, and sequential structure. It always induces efficient equilibria, for which a closed-form characterization is provided. The findings are relevant for the design of organizations seeking to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence activities.
{"title":"Efficient communication in organizations","authors":"Federico Vaccari","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107420","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107420","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies the organization of communication between biased senders and a receiver in binary decision-making problems. Senders can misreport their private information at a cost. Efficiency is achieved by resolving information asymmetries without incurring these costs—i.e., by attaining the complete-information outcome. Only one communication protocol is efficient, robust to collusion, and free from unnecessary complexities. This protocol has a simple, adversarial, and sequential structure. It always induces efficient equilibria, for which a closed-form characterization is provided. The findings are relevant for the design of organizations seeking to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence activities.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107420"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-12DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107413
Lu Dong , Lingbo Huang
Preventive war arises from fears of future power shifts threatening the status quo. However, critics argue that since power shifts can be influenced by states’ strategic decisions, preventive war can always be avoided. Using a lab experiment and a representative survey, this paper investigates how states’ endogenous decisions affect the likelihood of conflict. We focus on two strategies: a containment policy, where rising states halt their own growth to prevent a power shift, and a commitment policy, where they make binding future offers without altering the power shift trajectory. Our findings show that while both policies reduce the likelihood of preventive war, containment is much less preferred than commitment. Additionally, declining states often resort to costly coercive containment measures rather than trusting the self-containment of rising states. In the representative survey, we pose conceptually similar questions to understand broader public opinions regarding international politics and find patterns that are consistent with the experimental results.
{"title":"Curtailed ambition: Endogenous power shift and preventive war","authors":"Lu Dong , Lingbo Huang","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107413","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107413","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Preventive war arises from fears of future power shifts threatening the status quo. However, critics argue that since power shifts can be influenced by states’ strategic decisions, preventive war can always be avoided. Using a lab experiment and a representative survey, this paper investigates how states’ endogenous decisions affect the likelihood of conflict. We focus on two strategies: a containment policy, where rising states halt their own growth to prevent a power shift, and a commitment policy, where they make binding future offers without altering the power shift trajectory. Our findings show that while both policies reduce the likelihood of preventive war, containment is much less preferred than commitment. Additionally, declining states often resort to costly coercive containment measures rather than trusting the self-containment of rising states. In the representative survey, we pose conceptually similar questions to understand broader public opinions regarding international politics and find patterns that are consistent with the experimental results.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107413"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-12DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107418
Nicole Black , Danusha Jayawardana , Gawain Heckley
Recent research shows that birth order affects human capital outcomes, yet there is limited empirical evidence on the underlying mechanisms. This study examines the effect of birth order on children’s time use across activities that are important for human capital development. Using detailed time-use diaries of Australian children aged 2–15, we find that within families with two or three children, later-born children spend less time on enrichment activities and more on digital media, compared to first-born children. We obtain the same findings when we repeat the analysis using detailed time-use diaries of US children. Further investigation reveals that part of the birth order effect is driven by parents spending less time with later-born children compared to first-borns. However, later-borns also independently devote less of their own time to enrichment activities, suggesting that personal time use may be an important mechanism behind the well-documented impact of birth order on human capital development. We find evidence that later-born children experience more lenient parenting, which may help explain this pattern of own time use.
{"title":"The effect of birth order on children’s time use","authors":"Nicole Black , Danusha Jayawardana , Gawain Heckley","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107418","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107418","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Recent research shows that birth order affects human capital outcomes, yet there is limited empirical evidence on the underlying mechanisms. This study examines the effect of birth order on children’s time use across activities that are important for human capital development. Using detailed time-use diaries of Australian children aged 2–15, we find that within families with two or three children, later-born children spend less time on enrichment activities and more on digital media, compared to first-born children. We obtain the same findings when we repeat the analysis using detailed time-use diaries of US children. Further investigation reveals that part of the birth order effect is driven by parents spending less time with later-born children compared to first-borns. However, later-borns also independently devote less of their <em>own</em> time to enrichment activities, suggesting that personal time use may be an important mechanism behind the well-documented impact of birth order on human capital development. We find evidence that later-born children experience more lenient parenting, which may help explain this pattern of own time use.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107418"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-10DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107416
Luigi Guiso , Tullio Jappelli
We implement a survey experiment to study whether awareness of the consequences of hydrogeological risk affects people’s willingness to fight it. We use a representative panel of 5,000 Italian individuals interviewed at quarterly frequency, starting in October 2023. We elicit survey participants’ willingness to contribute to a public fund to finance investment to secure areas exposed to hydrogeological risk under different information treatments. We find that disclosing information about the consequences of hydrogeological risk causes individuals to increase both support for public funding and individual willingness to pay for the policy. Compared to the control group, individuals exposed to the treatment were 9 percentage points more likely to contribute to the fund and more willing to contribute an additional €29. Applying the information treatment to the whole working age population could raise as much as €0.26 billion per year. The willingness to pay depends on individual knowledge that the success of the policy depends critically on the willingness to pay of other citizens. Our results suggest also that one-off campaigns increase the willingness to pay only in the short run, and to be effective campaigns should not be time limited. In fact, refreshing the treatment in a follow-up survey reinstates its effect.
{"title":"Are people willing to pay to prevent natural disasters?","authors":"Luigi Guiso , Tullio Jappelli","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107416","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107416","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We implement a survey experiment to study whether awareness of the consequences of hydrogeological risk affects people’s willingness to fight it. We use a representative panel of 5,000 Italian individuals interviewed at quarterly frequency, starting in October 2023. We elicit survey participants’ willingness to contribute to a public fund to finance investment to secure areas exposed to hydrogeological risk under different information treatments. We find that disclosing information about the consequences of hydrogeological risk causes individuals to increase both support for public funding and individual willingness to pay for the policy. Compared to the control group, individuals exposed to the treatment were 9 percentage points more likely to contribute to the fund and more willing to contribute an additional €29. Applying the information treatment to the whole working age population could raise as much as €0.26 billion per year. The willingness to pay depends on individual knowledge that the success of the policy depends critically on the willingness to pay of other citizens. Our results suggest also that one-off campaigns increase the willingness to pay only in the short run, and to be effective campaigns should not be time limited. In fact, refreshing the treatment in a follow-up survey reinstates its effect.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107416"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145941117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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