Remembering and relearning: against exclusionism

IF 1.1 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-10 DOI:10.1007/s11098-024-02265-w
Juan F. Álvarez
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Abstract

Many philosophers endorse “exclusionism”, the view that no instance of relearning qualifies as a case of genuine remembering, and vice versa. Appealing to simulationist, distributed causalist, and trace minimalist theories of remembering, I develop three conditional arguments against exclusionism. First, if simulationism is right to hold that some cases of remembering involve reliance on post-event testimonial information, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Second, if distributed causalism is right to hold that memory traces are promiscuous, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Finally, if trace minimalism is right to hold that vicarious experiences sometimes produce the minimal traces that ground remembering, then remembering does not exclude relearning. While advocates of these theories might incorporate additional conditions designed to accommodate exclusionism, the only reason they can appeal to in favor of doing so is intuition: neither the fundamental components of the theories nor the empirical results on which they are based provide a reason to endorse exclusionism. An investigation of exclusionism thus raises metaphilosophical questions, so far overlooked in philosophy of memory, about the appropriate role of intuition in theorizing about remembering.

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许多哲学家都赞同 "排除主义",即认为任何重新学习的实例都不符合真正记忆的条件,反之亦然。根据模拟主义、分布式因果主义和痕迹最小主义记忆理论,我提出了三个反对排除主义的条件论点。首先,如果模拟主义认为记忆的某些情况涉及对事后证词信息的依赖是正确的,那么记忆并不排除再学习。其次,如果分布式因果论认为记忆痕迹是杂乱无章的,那么记忆并不排除再学习。最后,如果痕迹最小主义认为替代经验有时会产生作为记忆基础的最小痕迹,那么记忆并不排斥再学习。虽然这些理论的倡导者可能会加入一些旨在适应排除主义的附加条件,但他们这样做的唯一理由是直觉:无论是这些理论的基本内容还是它们所依据的经验结果,都没有提供支持排除主义的理由。因此,对排除主义的研究提出了记忆哲学中至今被忽视的形而上学问题,即直觉在记忆理论化中的适当作用。
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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
127
期刊介绍: Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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