Pub Date : 2026-02-09DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02475-w
Ulf Hlobil, Robert B. Brandom
{"title":"Précis of Reasons for Logic, Logic for Reasons","authors":"Ulf Hlobil, Robert B. Brandom","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02475-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02475-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146138578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-04DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02464-z
Kaitlyn Creasy
{"title":"Stubborn social emotions and their harms","authors":"Kaitlyn Creasy","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02464-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02464-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146138585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-04DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02480-7
Guy Kahane
Nozick famously argued that life inside an Experience Machine (EM) is dismal because it severs our connection to external reality. Would life spent in Virtual Reality (VR) be similarly dismal? Chalmers argues that because VR is importantly different from an EM, life in VR can be roughly as good as life outside. Chalmers further argues for Virtual Realism, the view that virtual worlds can be unqualifiedly real. I examine the relation between these claims about VR and the idea that there’s special value in connecting to the external world. The EM itself, I argue, can only weakly support the value of such a connection. And VR, as understood by Chalmers, is different from the EM precisely by permitting us to retain extensive links to the non-virtual world. We can better test the value of a connection to external reality by considering a more restrictive version of VR. This narrower form of VR is, I argue, inferior to life outside in several ways. Some of my arguments for this also support the idea of a valuable connection with reality—but only if Virtual Realism is false. By contrast, and contrary to the impression given by Chalmers, Virtual Realism seems to make little difference to questions about the value of life in VR vs. life outside.
{"title":"Virtual reality, value, and the external world","authors":"Guy Kahane","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02480-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02480-7","url":null,"abstract":"Nozick famously argued that life inside an Experience Machine (EM) is dismal because it severs our connection to external reality. Would life spent in Virtual Reality (VR) be similarly dismal? Chalmers argues that because VR is importantly different from an EM, life in VR can be roughly as good as life outside. Chalmers further argues for Virtual Realism, the view that virtual worlds can be unqualifiedly real. I examine the relation between these claims about VR and the idea that there’s special value in connecting to the external world. The EM itself, I argue, can only weakly support the value of such a connection. And VR, as understood by Chalmers, is different from the EM precisely by permitting us to retain extensive links to the non-virtual world. We can better test the value of a connection to external reality by considering a more restrictive version of VR. This narrower form of VR is, I argue, inferior to life outside in several ways. Some of my arguments for this also support the idea of a valuable connection with reality—but <jats:italic>only</jats:italic> if Virtual Realism is false. By contrast, and contrary to the impression given by Chalmers, Virtual Realism seems to make little difference to questions about the value of life in VR vs. life outside.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146138582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-04DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02487-0
James H. McIntyre
This paper argues that two of the theoretical virtues—ontological and ideological parsimony—reduce to a more foundational and familiar theoretical imperative to avoid positing brute facts. Following recent developments in metaphysics, I characterize ontological and ideological parsimony as principles that impose theoretical costs on fundamental ontology and primitive ideology respectively. I subsequently argue that both sorts of theoretical commitment entail costly brute (i.e., ungrounded) commitments. We can thus understand ontological and ideological parsimony as reducing to brute fact parsimony . After defending this proposal against objections, I extend it to the non-fundamental by introducing the notion of domain-relative bruteness, thereby explaining parsimony’s role in the special sciences. If my argument is successful, then it is now possible to weigh previously incommensurable virtues against each other. I suggest that this may facilitate progress in the debate about the laws of nature.
{"title":"Brute fact parsimony","authors":"James H. McIntyre","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02487-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02487-0","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that two of the theoretical virtues—ontological and ideological parsimony—reduce to a more foundational and familiar theoretical imperative to avoid positing brute facts. Following recent developments in metaphysics, I characterize ontological and ideological parsimony as principles that impose theoretical costs on <jats:italic>fundamental</jats:italic> ontology and <jats:italic>primitive</jats:italic> ideology respectively. I subsequently argue that both sorts of theoretical commitment entail costly <jats:italic>brute</jats:italic> (i.e., ungrounded) commitments. We can thus understand ontological and ideological parsimony as reducing to <jats:italic>brute fact parsimony</jats:italic> . After defending this proposal against objections, I extend it to the non-fundamental by introducing the notion of <jats:italic>domain-relative</jats:italic> bruteness, thereby explaining parsimony’s role in the special sciences. If my argument is successful, then it is now possible to weigh previously incommensurable virtues against each other. I suggest that this may facilitate progress in the debate about the laws of nature.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146138587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-04DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02483-4
Federico Pailos, Agustina Borzi, Joaquin S. Toranzo Calderón
{"title":"Many more reasons: critical notes on Reasons for Logic, Logic for Reasons","authors":"Federico Pailos, Agustina Borzi, Joaquin S. Toranzo Calderón","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02483-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02483-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146138584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-04DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02440-7
Lisa Vogt
According to an influential view in the debate on grounding and essence, there cannot be any cases of ‘upwards essence’, i.e., cases in which a grounding connection flows from the essence of the grounding truth or constituents of it. To use the Finean (2012a) slogan, “it is the fact to be grounded that ‘points’ to its grounds and not the grounds that point to what they may ground”. This paper argues to the contrary. Far from being outright incoherent, potential cases of upwards essence abound. The arguments that have been raised against upwards essence or naturally come to mind turn out to be wanting on closer examination. And we can even derive the existence of certain cases of upwards essence from fairly innocuous general principles.
{"title":"Upwards essence","authors":"Lisa Vogt","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02440-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02440-7","url":null,"abstract":"According to an influential view in the debate on grounding and essence, there cannot be any cases of ‘upwards essence’, i.e., cases in which a grounding connection flows from the essence of the grounding truth or constituents of it. To use the Finean (2012a) slogan, “it is the fact to be grounded that ‘points’ to its grounds and not the grounds that point to what they may ground”. This paper argues to the contrary. Far from being outright incoherent, potential cases of upwards essence abound. The arguments that have been raised against upwards essence or naturally come to mind turn out to be wanting on closer examination. And we can even derive the existence of certain cases of upwards essence from fairly innocuous general principles.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"94 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146138586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-04DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02401-0
Sara Aronowitz
{"title":"How many beliefs can you fit in your head?","authors":"Sara Aronowitz","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02401-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02401-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146138583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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