Psychological mechanisms underlying the biased interpretation of numerical scientific evidence.

IF 3.7 1区 心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL Journal of Experimental Psychology: General Pub Date : 2024-12-16 DOI:10.1037/xge0001704
Clint McKenna, David Dunning
{"title":"Psychological mechanisms underlying the biased interpretation of numerical scientific evidence.","authors":"Clint McKenna, David Dunning","doi":"10.1037/xge0001704","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Do people use their statistical expertise selectively to reach preferred conclusions when evaluating scientific evidence, with those more expert showing more preferential bias? We investigated this motivated numeracy account of evidence evaluation but came to a different account for biased evaluation. Across three studies (<i>N</i> = 2,799), participants interpreted numerical data from gun control intervention studies. In Studies 1 and 2, participants reached accurate conclusions more frequently from scientific data when those data aligned with their political preferences than when they did not, an attitude congeniality effect. This bias was unrelated to numerical ability (i.e., numeracy) and cognitive effort, although each variable predicted correct reasoning independently. Probing further, we found that attitude congeniality did not prompt people to discover valid statistical rationales for their more frequent correct conclusions. Rather, people came to right conclusions more often but for wrong reasons, suggesting why numerical ability need not be related to the congeniality effect. In Study 2, we showed this pattern was not due to forced guessing. In Study 3, we showed that the rationales, whether right or wrong, carried some weight over multiple scenarios, indicating that participants were not just expressive responding-that is, simply stating preferred conclusion regardless of the data. Statistical training did not reduce attitude congeniality biases. We suggest that people engage in \"expressive rationalization\" rather than \"rationality\" to reach preferred conclusions, finding convenient rationales for preferred conclusions that need not be valid, even though they can lead to conclusions that are. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001704","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Do people use their statistical expertise selectively to reach preferred conclusions when evaluating scientific evidence, with those more expert showing more preferential bias? We investigated this motivated numeracy account of evidence evaluation but came to a different account for biased evaluation. Across three studies (N = 2,799), participants interpreted numerical data from gun control intervention studies. In Studies 1 and 2, participants reached accurate conclusions more frequently from scientific data when those data aligned with their political preferences than when they did not, an attitude congeniality effect. This bias was unrelated to numerical ability (i.e., numeracy) and cognitive effort, although each variable predicted correct reasoning independently. Probing further, we found that attitude congeniality did not prompt people to discover valid statistical rationales for their more frequent correct conclusions. Rather, people came to right conclusions more often but for wrong reasons, suggesting why numerical ability need not be related to the congeniality effect. In Study 2, we showed this pattern was not due to forced guessing. In Study 3, we showed that the rationales, whether right or wrong, carried some weight over multiple scenarios, indicating that participants were not just expressive responding-that is, simply stating preferred conclusion regardless of the data. Statistical training did not reduce attitude congeniality biases. We suggest that people engage in "expressive rationalization" rather than "rationality" to reach preferred conclusions, finding convenient rationales for preferred conclusions that need not be valid, even though they can lead to conclusions that are. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
6.20
自引率
4.90%
发文量
300
期刊介绍: The Journal of Experimental Psychology: General publishes articles describing empirical work that bridges the traditional interests of two or more communities of psychology. The work may touch on issues dealt with in JEP: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, JEP: Human Perception and Performance, JEP: Animal Behavior Processes, or JEP: Applied, but may also concern issues in other subdisciplines of psychology, including social processes, developmental processes, psychopathology, neuroscience, or computational modeling. Articles in JEP: General may be longer than the usual journal publication if necessary, but shorter articles that bridge subdisciplines will also be considered.
期刊最新文献
Let them eat ceke: An electrophysiological study of form-based prediction in rich naturalistic contexts. Normative and informational confidence matching. Partitioned prosociality: Why giving a large donation bit by bit makes people seem more committed to social causes. Psychological mechanisms underlying the biased interpretation of numerical scientific evidence. Experience-dependent biases in face discrimination reveal associations between perceptual specialization and narrowing.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1