Journal of Experimental Psychology: General最新文献

A growing literature has shown that people tend to make faster decisions when choosing between two high-intensity or high-utility options than when choosing between two less-intensity or low-utility options. However, the underlying cognitive mechanisms of this effect of overall value (OV) on response times (RT) remains controversial, partially due to inconsistent findings of OV effects on accuracy but also due to the lack of process-tracing studies testing this effect. Here, we set out to fill this gap by testing and modeling the influence of OV on choices, RT, and eye movements in both perceptual and preferential decisions in a preregistered eye-tracking experiment (N = 61). Across perceptual and preferential tasks, we observed significant and consistently negative correlations between OV and RT, replicating previous work. Accuracy tended to increase with OV, reaching significance in preferential choices only. Eye-tracking analyses revealed a reduction of different gaze-related effects under high OV: a reduced tendency to choose the longer fixated option in perceptual choice and a reduced tendency to choose the last fixated option in preferential choice. Modeling these data with the attentional drift-diffusion model showed that the nonfixated option value was discounted least in the high-OV condition, confirming that higher OV might mitigate the impact of gaze on choices. Our results suggest that OV jointly affects behavior and gaze influences and offer a mechanistic account for the puzzling phenomenon that decisions between options of higher OV tend to be faster, but not less accurate. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

The severity and pervasiveness of anti-fat prejudice and discrimination have led to calls for interventions to address them. However, intervention studies to combat anti-fat prejudice have often been stymied by ineffective approaches, small sample sizes, and the lack of standardization in measurement. To that end, we conducted two mega-experiments totaling 27,726 participants and 50 conditions where we tested five intervention approaches to reduce implicit anti-fat prejudice across five implicit measures. We found that interventions were most effective at reducing implicit weight biases when they instructed people to practice an explicit rule linking fat people with good things and thin people with bad things. Interventions that were more indirect or relied on associative learning tended to be ineffective. We also found that change in implicit bias on one implicit measure often generalized to other implicit measures. However, the Evaluative Priming Task and single-target measures of implicit bias like the Single-Target Implicit Association Test were much less sensitive to change. These findings illuminate promising approaches to combating implicit anti-fat prejudice and advance understanding of how implicit bias change generalizes across measures. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

Do people change their preferences when they are offered the same risky lotteries at different times (now vs. the future)? Construal level theory (CLT) suggests that people do because our mental representation of events is moderated by how near or distant such events are in time. According to CLT, in the domain of risk preferences, psychological distance causes payoffs and probabilities to be differentially weighted or attended between present and future timepoints: Temporal distance increases the influence of payoffs and decreases the influence of probabilities. Specifically, CLT predicts that high probability/low amount lotteries (i.e., %-lotteries) are preferred in the present, whereas low probability/high amount lotteries (i.e., $-lotteries) are preferred in the future, even when the expected value of these lotteries is identical. We present a functional characterization and systematic investigation of this putative pattern of risk preferences and develop a formal model that incorporates CLT's predictions. In five experiments, we examined several factors that could moderate the effect (e.g., outcome and probability magnitude, lottery presentation format, incentivization procedures). Both our behavioral observations and modeling results suggest the effect is labile, and if it does occur, it is not fully consistent with our formal model of CLT. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

The attentional blink (AB) demonstrates that recognizing the second of two targets (T1 and T2) is difficult when they appear in close succession in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) stream. The AB has been widely accepted as a suppression of T2 processing at the postperceptual stage. The current event-related potential study updates this view by demonstrating the existence of an early perceptual locus of suppression during the AB. Using line drawings of real-life objects as RSVP items, we required participants in Experiment 1 to either discriminate the exact identities or simply classify the object categories of T1 and T2, and in Experiment 2, we instructed participants to discriminate either T1 and T2 identities (dual-target task) or only T2 identity (single-target task) to invalidate the temporal expectation as an alternative account. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 showed that the T2-elicited first positive peak (P1) component was consistently decreased at Lag 3 whenever a dual-target, but not single-target, task was required, and the magnitude of this P1 suppression was significantly predictive of the behavioral AB magnitude in each dual-target task. When the RSVP items were substituted by classic but size-matched alphanumeric characters in Experiment 3, no P1 suppression was evident as expected, ruling out the large stimulus size as an alternative interpretation. These findings provide the strongest evidence to date that the AB can begin to suppress T2 processing at a very early perceptual stage, at least when observers encounter RSVP items of real-life objects, which calls for more flexible cognitive models for the AB. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

Traditional explanations for stereotypes assume that they result from deficits in humans (ingroup-favoring motives, cognitive biases) or their environments (majority advantages, real group differences). An alternative explanation recently proposed that stereotypes can emerge when exploration is costly. Even optimal decision makers in an ideal environment can inadvertently form incorrect impressions from arbitrary encounters. However, all these existing theories essentially describe shortcuts that fail to explain the multidimensionality of stereotypes. Stereotypes of social groups have a canonical multidimensional structure, organized along dimensions of warmth and competence. We show that these dimensions and the associated stereotypes can result from feature-based exploration: When individuals make self-interested decisions based on past experiences in an environment where exploring new options carries an implicit cost and when these options share similar attributes, they are more likely to separate groups along multiple dimensions. We formalize this theory via the contextual multiarmed bandit problem, use the resulting model to generate testable predictions, and evaluate those predictions against human behavior. We evaluate this process in incentivized decisions involving as many as 20 real jobs and successfully recover the classic dimensions of warmth and competence. Further experiments show that intervening on the cost of exploration effectively mitigates bias, further demonstrating that exploration cost per se is the operating variable. Future diversity interventions may consider how to reduce exploration cost, in ways that parallel our manipulations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

This article investigates cross-cultural differences in analytic/holistic cognitive styles among participants from 11 countries: Armenia, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czechia, Germany, Ghana, Philippines, Slovakia, Taiwan, and Türkiye. Using a preregistered design, 993 university students were assessed with three perceptual tasks based on Navon's hierarchical figures and Gottschaldt's embedded figures. Analytic and holistic cognitive styles were estimated using reaction time modeling, specifically a Bayesian four-parameter shifted Wald distribution and a hierarchical linear ballistic accumulator model. The results revealed notable cross-cultural variations in cognitive styles, though these differences did not align with predictions from analytic/holistic cognitive style theory. Countries traditionally characterized as more holistic or analytic did not consistently show the expected cognitive style patterns. Multilevel modeling examined the influence of country-level variables, such as Hofstede's and Schwartz's cultural dimensions. While some dimensions, like individualism and long-term orientation, were associated with both analytic and holistic thinking, many cultural predictors had no significant impact on cognitive styles. Additionally, exploratory latent profile analysis assessed cognitive metastyles, such as flexibility and rigidity, but the findings do not support the presence of a rigidity metastyle. No profiles exhibited a strong preference for one cognitive dimension while showing a low preference for the other. These findings challenge the straightforward application of analytic/holistic theory across diverse cultural contexts and suggest a need for reevaluation of its generalizability. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

Considerable research shows that causal perception emerges between 6 and 10 months of age. Yet, because this research tends to use artificial stimuli, it is unanswered how or through what mechanisms of change human infants learn about the causal properties of real-world categories such as animate entities and inanimate objects. One answer to this question is that this knowledge is innate (i.e., unlearned, evolutionarily ancient, and possibly present at birth) and underpinned by core knowledge and core cognition. An alternative perspective that is tested here through computer simulations is that infants acquire this knowledge via domain-general associative learning. This article demonstrates that associative learning alone-as instantiated in an artificial neural network-is sufficient to explain the data presented in four classic infancy studies: Spelke et al. (1995), Saxe et al. (2005), Saxe et al. (2007), and Markson and Spelke (2006). This work not only advances theoretical perspectives within developmental psychology but also has implications for the design of artificial intelligence systems inspired by human cognitive development. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

What makes an object complex? Complexity comes in many different forms. Some objects are visually complex but mechanistically simple (e.g., a hairbrush). Other objects are the opposite; they look simple but work in a complex way (e.g., an iPhone). Is one kind of complexity more fundamental to how we represent, attend to, and remember objects? Although most existing psychological research on complexity focuses on visual complexity, we argue that mechanistic complexity may be more consequential: Across five preregistered experiments (N = 780 adults), we show that mechanistic complexity not only predicts explicit judgments but also drives visual attention and memory. Thus, representations of object complexity-and object representations more broadly-rely on more than just external appearance. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

Pretesting, or asking a test question prior to the onset of learning, is a well-established means of enhancing learning. Research on pretesting has focused primarily on direct factual learning outcomes. Yet building a coherent knowledge base also depends on productive memory processes that permit going beyond the information directly given. In the specific productive process of self-derivation through memory integration, individual differences are prominent; verbal comprehension is a consistent predictor. In the current work, we integrated these research trends by testing the extent to which pretesting enhances learning through productive memory processes and the role played by individual differences in verbal comprehension. Across four within-subjects experiments, we assessed the pretest effect after accounting for variability associated with verbal comprehension. In Experiments 1-3, we assessed the productive memory process of self-derivation through memory integration. Adults were more successful on pretest trials compared to control (i.e., no pretest) trials, but this effect was no longer significant after controlling for verbal comprehension. This pattern emerged when we used stem-fact pretests (Experiment 1) and integration-fact pretests (Experiment 2) to probe self-derivation across single-sentence stimuli and replicated when we used stimuli more akin to everyday learning materials (i.e., text passages and photographs; Experiment 3). In Experiment 4, we shifted the test target from productive processes to fact recall and found the pretest effect held even after controlling for verbal comprehension. This research bridges the pretest and productive process literature to provide novel insight into ways of maximizing learning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

Psychologists have long been intrigued by decision-induced changes in preferences where making a decision strengthens one's relative preference between more and less preferred options. This phenomenon has been explained through two prominent theories: a dissonance account, which suggests that it results from the decision maker's attempt to minimize an unpleasant emotional-motivational state of "dissonance," and an inference account, which posits that it reflects a process of inferring and updating one's "true" preferences. In the current research, we investigate whether, how, and why framing a decision as a choice or a rejection influences decision-induced preference modulation. Across 13 preregistered experiments, including seven (N = 6,248 participants from North America and Asia) reported in the main text, we find that reject-framed decisions between attractive options induce greater postdecision preference modulation (i.e., a larger preference gap between options) than choose-framed decisions, all else equal. Supporting the inference account, the effect is moderated by attribute similarity and choice set valence while being mediated consistently by perceived action diagnosticity. In contrast, purported moderators and process measures of the dissonance account received no support when tested. Additionally, we systematically address potential confounds associated with varying levels of "noise" in preference expression through decisions, an issue that had encumbered previous paradigms on preference modulation. Our findings suggest that changes in preference induced by ordinary day-to-day decisions primarily stem from an ongoing process of information inference and updating rather than dissonance reduction. This research also provides insights into the previously unforeseen consequences of framing interventions in policy and business. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).