Effects of increasing risk in common resource exploitation under cost asymmetry

Abstract

In their in situ habitat, renewable resource populations are subject to stochastic growth caused by environmental variability such as fluctuations in upwelling conditions or temperature. In this paper, we examine the effects of this type of uncertainty on the noncooperative harvest decisions made by harvesters exploiting a common-pool renewable resource. To do this, we extend the related literature on dynamic resource extraction games based on Markov strategies to allow for asymmetric extraction costs and general economic, biological, and environmental conditions. We find equilibrium behaviors that can reverse conventional wisdom. For example, in response to increasing risk caused by anticipated higher variability in biological growth, a harvester may choose to enhance conservation efforts, whereas another harvester diminishes his escapement. Increasing risk can lead to conflicts as it may increase a harvester's payoff while causing a loss to another harvester. In response to an increase in the discount rate, we find that strategic interactions can give rise to greater conservation efforts. Overall, this paper highlights the importance of adequately accounting for uncertainty and strategic behaviors in renewable resource management.