What is unique about acceptance and correction of misinformation? Insights from work on attitudes, persuasion, and beyond.

Abstract

Research on misinformation has exploded over the past decade in psychology and other disciplines. Much research has been conducted about which variables are associated with the initial acceptance of misinformation (i.e., false statements such as "Venice is the capital of Italy") and which variables are associated with its correction ("No. Rome is the capital of Italy"). A largely independent literature exists about which variables are associated with the initial acceptance of attitudinal claims (i.e., opinion statements such as "Rome is a beautiful city") and their correction (e.g., "No, Rome is not a beautiful city"). This article addresses whether the variables impacting the acceptance of factual claims (often expressed as truth judgments) and opinion claims (often expressed as evaluative judgments) are the same. Concluding that these assessments are mostly impacted similarly by the same variables (e.g., source credibility, claim repetition), it is argued that these two seemingly separate literatures should be integrated into one science of persuasion, at least for studies aimed at making general contributions. Finally, findings from the attitudes literature that potentially can inform the misinformation literature and vice versa are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).