The Design of Autocratic Trade Agreements: Economic Integration and Political Survival

Abstract

s The number of preferential trade agreements signed among non-democratic states (autocratic PTAs) has grown significantly over the last decades. Trade policy scholarship remains silent on the institutional design of these autocratic economic arrangements. In this paper, we explore the core institutional characteristic of autocratic PTAs—their depth. It has been shown that many North–South and, increasingly, South–South PTAs tend to be deep, yet the depth of PTAs comprised of autocratic members remains puzzling, as government elites are faced with competing pressures for economic integration and political survival. We argue that autocratic PTAs tend to have considerable depth when it comes to the coverage of certain trade-plus issues, such as investment and trade-in services, due to the desire of government elites to attract trade and investment and enhance the ruling regime's legitimacy and political survival. However, dispute settlement provisions that could breach domestic political autonomy are carefully eschewed. We also expect to see higher levels of agreement flexibility in deep autocratic PTAs, reflecting autocrats’ dual interests in economic openness and political control. We test these expectations using data from the Design of Trade Agreements Database and we carry out interviews with trade officials to clarify the mechanisms at work.