“Black-and-White” thinking: Does visual contrast polarize moral judgment? Independent replications and extension of Study 1

Abstract

Does a black-and-white contrast background lead to more extreme moral judgments? Zarkadi and Schnall (2013) found in their Study 1 (N = 111) that, indeed, exposing English-speaking participants to a black-and-white (versus two other-colored conditions) background polarized participants' judgments in a moral dilemma task. This study supported a moral intuitionist model of moral judgment, lent further support to so-called Conceptual Metaphor Theories (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), and provided evidence that not only the colors “black” and “white” influence our moral perception, but that the metaphorical associations with the combination of those two colors (i.e., “black-and-white thinking”, Yin-Yang) led people to have more extreme moral judgments. Due to the striking nature of this finding, yet given various factors that undermine confidence in its veracity, we have decided to re-examine the question. A first study conducted on a large French-speaking sample (N = 8602), and two subsequent direct replications conducted on English-speaking samples (N = 365 and N = 215), failed to reveal any influence of background color on the evaluation of a moral dilemma. Numerous exploratory and supplementary analyses, including controlling for relevant covariates associated with variations in morality (e.g., age, gender), did not account for our consistent inability to replicate the original findings. This research suggests that age may influence perceived morality, with older participants (at least in Study 1) viewing Heinz's behavior as more wrong. Overall, this research suggests that it is doubtful that the evaluation of the Heinz's dilemma can be influenced by a subtle black-and-white visual priming.