Voltage-Sensitivity-Based Attack Strategy Against Remote State Estimation in Power Systems: Attack Design and Mitigation

Abstract

This paper investigates the attack-defense framework for power systems, a novel voltage-sensitivity-based (VSB) attack schedule method is proposed to maximize the attack destructiveness of the remote estimator of the target bus in the power system, and a mitigation mechanism is also constructed to make up for the negative effect of the proposed attacks. Firstly, the relationship between voltage and input current at different buses within the power system is analyzed, and the voltage sensitivity of target buses to other buses is calculated. Based on this, a VSB attack strategy is proposed to maximize the attack disruption on the target bus by targeting those with higher voltage sensitivity. Secondly, considering the clear periodicity of voltage signals, an enhanced local outlier factor algorithm is proposed to mitigate the proposed attack strategy. This algorithm can identify abnormal situations by detecting outliers and compensate for the attack by establishing a voltage model. Finally, the effectiveness of both the attack design method and mitigation strategy is validated through extensive simulation experiments conducted on the IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus systems. Note to Practitioners—This paper is motivated by the escalating challenges of attack-defense problems in power systems. From the perspective of attackers, existing DoS attack strategies often lack discrimination. They operate without considering the specific characteristics of the target, proceeding with attacks based on predetermined sequences while disregarding the varying importance of information carried by different targets. In response, this paper proposes a novel VSB attack strategy that utilizes readily available information to evaluate the voltage sensitivity of each bus within the power system. By targeting buses with high sensitivity, this strategy aims to magnify its destructive impact. From the perspective of defenders, this paper proposes utilizing the periodicity of voltage signals to mitigate the aforementioned attack strategy. Through simulation, the effectiveness of the proposed attack-defense framework is demonstrated from both attacker and defender perspectives.