Resilient Controller Synthesis Against DoS Attacks for Vehicular Platooning in Spatial Domain

Abstract

This paper proposes a vehicular platoon control approach under Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and external disturbances. DoS attacks increase the service time on the communication network and cause additional transmission delays, which consequently increase the risk of rear-end collisions of vehicles in the platoon. To counter DoS attacks, we propose a resilient control scheme that exploits polytopic overapproximations of the closed-loop dynamics under DoS attacks. This scheme allows synthesizing robust controllers that guarantee tracking of both the desired spacing policy and spatially varying reference velocity under all space-varying DoS attacks within a hard upper bound on the attack duration. In addition, $\mathcal {L}_{2}$ string stability conditions are derived to ensure that external perturbations do not grow as they propagate through the platoon, thus ensuring the string stability. Numerical simulations illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed control method.