More likely or more wrong? - Disentangling the prototype effect of discrimination perception

Abstract

Extensive evidence suggests that perceptions of discrimination are influenced by a mental prototype of what constitutes discriminatory behavior, the so-called prototype effect of discrimination perception. However, the underlying psychological processes and thus the extent to which statistical expectations and moral evaluations contribute to this prototype effect remain underexplored. In a series of four experiments, we investigated how expectations about discrimination and moral judgments about the wrongness of discrimination modulate the prototype effect. Our findings suggest that statistical expectations strongly influence the prototype effect independently of moral wrongness. In contrast, moral wrongness, while theoretically plausible, had a much smaller empirical impact on the prototype effect under our experimental conditions. These results suggest that the prototype effect in discrimination perception is driven by expectations, while the role of moral evaluations is at least secondary and requires additional research. This insight has important implications for understanding discrimination perception and offers new directions for research into the cognitive processes underlying discrimination judgments.