Game Theory-Based shore power Analysis: From the perspective of policy makers

Abstract

With growing concerns about ship emissions in port areas, access to shore power for berthed ships has become a critical component of green shipping initiatives. However, conflicting stakeholder interests pose challenges to the construction and promotion of shore power infrastructure. This paper analyzes the behavioral strategies of governments, port operators, and shipping companies by developing game models for these actors under three different policy scenarios: government non-intervention, mandatory measures such as emission taxes, and government subsidies. To quantify the impact of ship emissions on these interactions, an exhaust emission calculation model for berthed ships is developed based on the STEAM2 model and a localized database of emission correction factors for inland areas. The container terminal at Nanjing Port Longtan Harbor is used as a case study, where ship exhaust emissions are monetized as a social cost, taking into account the socio-economic context of the region. The findings indicate that under scenarios of government non-intervention and emission taxes, equilibrium strategies do not achieve optimal socio-economic benefits for the government. In contrast, under a subsidy policy, a well-calibrated subsidy can align the interests of the government, port operators and shipping companies to facilitate the implementation of shore power projects. This study provides valuable decision support for government policies related to shore power infrastructure.