Jurisdiction in online speech crime cases in the European Union

Abstract

This paper presents a new approach to jurisdiction over online communication-related crimes. It argues that, considering the protective aims of penal law and the unique nature of speech, asserting jurisdiction based on territorial connections is unjustified in this context. Drawing from jurisprudence, philosophy of law, and linguistics, it emphasizes that for speech to be performed, it requires not only intentional conduct by the perpetrator but also the necessary engagement of recipients who, by means of interpretive strategies, recognize this behavior as intentionally expressing the perpetrator's mental experiences. They need not be the direct victims of speech; however, through the recognition they performed, they can be influenced by it. Therefore, it concludes that the jurisdiction most relevant for evaluating speech is that of the state with the closest connection to those recipients. Additionally, it describes how such an approach would facilitate the European Union's efforts in combating harmful on-line expression.