The influence of politicians' sex on political budget cycles: An empirical analysis of Spanish municipalities

Abstract

Does a politician's sex influence political budget cycles (PBCs)? We answer this question using a sample of Spanish municipalities from the Madrid region for the period 2010–2019. The Madrid region has a homogenous set of budget rules that allow consistent categorization of budget expenditure items as either “mandatory” or “non-mandatory” public services. After differentiating between smaller and larger municipalities, gender influence is studied along two dimensions: the mayor's sex and the share of women in government. Our findings include, in regard to mandatory spending in smaller municipalities, that gender-balanced governments induce PBCs. In larger municipalities, when the share of women in government is above 60%, electoral spending is increased by up to 10% of an average municipal budget for mandatory spending, and up to 2.2% for non-mandatory. These findings are generally supported in a mixed-gender close election analysis.