Research on the Collaborative Mechanism of Value Creation in Public–Private Partnership Projects Under Dynamic Trust

IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-18 DOI:10.1002/mde.4424
Zehui Bu, Jicai Liu, Zujie Lu
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Public–private partnership (PPP) is now focused on project value creation, with trust playing a crucial role. This study models trust evolution among stakeholders using evolutionary game theory and simulations, revealing that higher initial and sustained trust boosts project value. However, overreliance on trust can lead to deregulation and neglect of contracts, harming outcomes. Spillover effects and speculative behavior also threaten value creation. The study identifies an optimal incentive range for reputation gains, highlighting the need for balanced trust mechanisms, effective incentives, and penalties to ensure collaboration and project success.

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动态信任下公私合作项目价值创造协同机制研究
公私伙伴关系(PPP)现在侧重于项目价值创造,信任起着至关重要的作用。本研究运用演化博弈论和模拟方法对干系人之间的信任演化进行建模,发现初始信任和持续信任越高,项目价值越高。然而,过度依赖信任可能导致放松管制和忽视合同,从而损害结果。溢出效应和投机行为也威胁到价值创造。该研究确定了声誉收益的最佳激励范围,强调了平衡信任机制、有效激励和惩罚的必要性,以确保合作和项目成功。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
18.20%
发文量
242
期刊介绍: Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.
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