Demand Information Forecasting and Sharing in a Remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chain

IF 2.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-30 DOI:10.1002/mde.4420
Meiling Zhou, Pin Zhou, Yuqing Xia, Xianpei Hong
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Abstract

We delve into the incorporation of demand information forecasting and the subsequent information sharing in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). We consider the competition between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and an independent remanufacturer (IR). The OEM autonomously determines whether to forecast demand information and further considers whether to disseminate the realized demand signal to the IR. We find that the IR adopts either a partial- or a full-remanufacturing strategy to compete with the OEM. The OEM shares negative demand signals with the IR, as such signals decrease the retail prices and increase the production quantity of all-new products. Additionally, the sharing of negative demand signals helps alleviate the cannibalization effect caused by the introduction of remanufactured products. When examining the optimal sharing strategy in equilibrium, the OEM only invests in forecasting demand if the forecasting cost is relatively low. Furthermore, the numerical studies reveal that, in equilibrium, the OEM does not necessarily benefit from possessing more precise demand information. Additionally, we assess the influence of consumers' environmental awareness on the production decisions of both companies. The findings indicate that heightened environmental awareness prompts the IR to adopt a full-remanufacturing strategy, and the information management strategies remain robust.

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再制造闭环供应链中的需求信息预测与共享
我们深入研究了在闭环供应链中需求信息预测和后续信息共享的结合。我们考虑原始设备制造商(OEM)和独立再制造商(IR)之间的竞争。OEM自主决定是否预测需求信息,并进一步考虑是否将实现的需求信号传播给IR。我们发现,在与OEM的竞争中,IR采用了部分再制造或完全再制造策略。OEM与IR共享负需求信号,因为这些信号降低了零售价格,增加了全新产品的产量。此外,负面需求信号的共享有助于缓解再制造产品引入带来的同类相食效应。当考察均衡下的最优共享策略时,OEM只在预测成本较低的情况下投资于预测需求。此外,数值研究表明,在均衡状态下,原始设备制造商并不一定从拥有更精确的需求信息中获益。此外,我们评估了消费者的环保意识对两家公司生产决策的影响。研究结果表明,环境意识的增强促使企业采取全面再制造战略,信息管理战略保持稳健。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
18.20%
发文量
242
期刊介绍: Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.
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