{"title":"Does shareholder overlap alleviate patent holdup?","authors":"Heng Geng , Harald Hau , Sandy Lai , Pengfei Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.respol.2024.105167","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Patent protection can generate holdup problems for follow-on innovators when technologies protected in early patents complement their inventions. This study investigates whether institutional shareholder overlap between firms with precursory patents and follow-on innovators can reduce such patent holdup problems. Using patent citation links to track complementary patents, we find empirical support for such a holdup attenuation hypothesis of institutional shareholder overlap. Follow-on innovators with greater institutional shareholder overlap to precursory patent owners enjoy greater success with their patent portfolio, face less patent conflict as measured by patent litigation, and feature higher levels of R&D investments. The holdup attenuation effect is stronger if product complexity makes securing ex ante patent licenses more difficult.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48466,"journal":{"name":"Research Policy","volume":"54 2","pages":"Article 105167"},"PeriodicalIF":7.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Research Policy","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048733324002166","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"MANAGEMENT","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Patent protection can generate holdup problems for follow-on innovators when technologies protected in early patents complement their inventions. This study investigates whether institutional shareholder overlap between firms with precursory patents and follow-on innovators can reduce such patent holdup problems. Using patent citation links to track complementary patents, we find empirical support for such a holdup attenuation hypothesis of institutional shareholder overlap. Follow-on innovators with greater institutional shareholder overlap to precursory patent owners enjoy greater success with their patent portfolio, face less patent conflict as measured by patent litigation, and feature higher levels of R&D investments. The holdup attenuation effect is stronger if product complexity makes securing ex ante patent licenses more difficult.
期刊介绍：
Research Policy (RP) articles explore the interaction between innovation, technology, or research, and economic, social, political, and organizational processes, both empirically and theoretically. All RP papers are expected to provide insights with implications for policy or management.
Research Policy (RP) is a multidisciplinary journal focused on analyzing, understanding, and effectively addressing the challenges posed by innovation, technology, R&D, and science. This includes activities related to knowledge creation, diffusion, acquisition, and exploitation in the form of new or improved products, processes, or services, across economic, policy, management, organizational, and environmental dimensions.
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